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Abstract 
What is the relationship between landscape and consciousness? We tend to differentiate land 
from the idea of landscape by invoking in the latter the presence of an intervening subject (or 
non-subject, or anti-subject). The conception of subjectivity and the sense of self, has been 
reshaped and rewritten in numerous ways within landscape discourse. Shifting intellectual 
currents have formulated and reformulated consciousness variously as: metaphysically 
immanent, false, discursive, displaced, de-centred, distributed and dispersed. 
 
This practice-led painting project re-examines the problem of consciousness in landscape theory 
and art practice in light of a redoubled scientific and philosophical re-engagement with the 
problem of consciousness since the 1990s. Despite the renewed if oblique return of subjectivity 
to more recent landscape discourse, consciousness research has been largely overlooked. While 
the exegesis integrates consciousness studies into the discussion more explicitly, the practice 
converses with these research fields through a material engagement with the painterly tradition 
of depicting the land. The studio enquiry intersects with the exegetical investigations and with 
conceptual issues identified in consciousness research through notions of assembly, integrated 
information, illusion, and representation.  
 
The insertion of the forensic way of seeing onto the landscape stage becomes a key way in 
which the practice investigates but also further complicates the research territory. Through the 
painting medium’s particular material language and phenomenological tone, through the studio 
practice’s evolving habits and its staging of certain figure/setting situations, the project 
contributes to the (missing) discussion around consciousness and the self in contemporary 
landscape art. 
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1. Prelude: The Landscape and its Subjects 
 
“Landscape as a process of dissimilating ideology has shifted to a process of gathering together 
the physical and cultural, the mental and the material” (Anderson, 2010, p. 1). 
 
Anderson’s observation captures an appetite in more recent discussions for thinking about 
landscape as a multi-dimensional interaction, one not reducible to the regimes of textual and 
ideological critique. Although folded into the “single” medium of painting, the final PhD 
exhibition too, is an outcome of thinking about landscape in similar ways, as a process of 
gathering together objective environmental data, perception, convention, ideology, sensation, 
and memory. Consciousness too is an element gathered into the landscape idea but it is also the 
medium via which landscape is expressed and received. As the exegesis argues, the idea of 
landscape involves a set of problems, dualities, and processes that are highly analogous to 
those found in consciousness research. 
 
Consciousness is therefore both implicated within the landscape idea but also analogous to it as 
a problem space. Hence consciousness research affords a useful and novel comparative 
framework through which we can re-examine the landscape idea. In scientifically grounded1 
consciousness research, much effort is directed toward finding correlations between 
neurophysiology and lived experience. The project draws conceptually and creatively on the 
scientific and philosophical search for these correlations between the felt qualities of conscious 
experience (first-person accounts) and the kinds of neuro- physiological mechanisms and 
processes that could generate them (consciousness as understood from objective third-person 
perspectives). The project takes a particular interest in how consciousness manages to 
synthesise a specific yet diffuse totality out of its many spatially and temporally separate 
elements or “inputs”. With the aim of moving from correlation to causation, these efforts (in 
consciousness research) confront a still mysterious process of transduction2 it seems between 
the material and the mental, the objective and the subjective, the fragment and the whole. These 
apparent dualities also underpin landscape research. Hence, these shared notions of specificity, 
integration, diffusion, totality and transduction animate the idea of landscape in these practice- 
 
1 The term “scientifically grounded” means to capture not only scientific disciplines but philosophical and 
psychological perspectives that are informed by, and engaged with, the scientific method and empirical findings. 
Indeed, the mystery of consciousness, perhaps more than any other scientific problem,  still requires the careful 
conceptual framings that philosophical traditions provide. 
 
2 Transduction has a number of technical uses (notably genetics) but in general terms it refers to a process of 
converting or transforming something into another kind of thing. 
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led investigations. The project attempts to explore and articulate how these parallel issues in 
consciousness studies and landscape inform the way the practice-led research proceeds. 
 
 
Background Radiation 
 
The exhibition engages with the landscape idea as a representational art form (as paintings in 
particular), as a multi- disciplinary set of ideas and practices, and as a potential encounter. The 
notion of the landscape-encounter emerges both as a possibility in the practice and from a 
reading of Georg Simmel’s conception of landscape. In his Die Philosophie der Landschaft 
(Simmel, 2007 originally published 1913) the philosopher articulates a process of exchange 
between subject and scene that seems in excess of what we would sufficiently require to 
recognise something as a “landscape”. If we define the landscape view as a perceptual binding 
of environmental elements into a self-sufficient totality (an orthodox definition), Simmel 
expresses an augmentation of this process whereby the external scene and the state of mind are 
mutually diffuse presences within an expanded totality. This augmentation of the landscape 
process into a more radical diffusion of self and scene I refer to as a landscape-encounter. 
Expressed via the more Romantic notion of Stimmung3, this mutual diffusion of self and scene 
becomes a momentary atunement of subject and environment, one in which the usually tacit 
processes at work within the subject-landscape exchange become phenomenologically 
accessible. The notion of the landscape-encounter then threatens to reveal processes that 
normally lie “beneath” conscious awareness and hence they also suggest opportunities for new 
knowledge. The practice seems to submit that such atunements and encounters however are not 
guaranteed by the mere juxtaposition of subject and setting but exist as a contingent potentiality 
determined by a larger set of (spatial, temporal, epistemological, neurological, physiological, 
ideological) variables, catalysts, and triggers mediated by painting as both a history and a 
material practice. 
 
The landscape-encounter— this brief diffuse process of atunement—becomes an immerging 
and illusive potentiality in the studio practice. The painted landscapes in turn become 
laboratories where such encounters between self and scene might transpire, or indeed fail to 
transpire. The final exhibition therefore is conceived less as a collection of landscapes than it is 
a collective musing upon the possibility of the landscape-encounter and the significance of such 
encounters in relation to consciousness. 
 
 
3 The term Stimmung is used by Simmel (2007) in his philosophical reading of landscape first published in 1913. 
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Foregrounding the Exhibition 
 
The final PhD exhibition, The Landscape and its Subjects consists of 27 wall-mounted oil 
paintings. 24 are small-format works of various dimensions tethered to a standardised 
measurement (31cms-ish) along either the height or width of each individual canvas. The 
frames I have constructed myself which allows for small sometimes uneasy shifts in scale not 
generally possible when using standardised store-bought frames. These small-format works are 
interposed by three large human-scale paintings. 
 
As with any practice/exegesis endeavour, the practice both develops the investigation and 
develops out of a wider circulation of ideas synthesised from landscape, visual arts, and 
consciousness research. The “story” of the creative project is one in which studio impulses and 
practices have developed into more reflexive research strategies. Those strategies emerge via 
formal, narrative and figurative treatments that experiment with the interactions between 
subjects, viewers, and landscape settings. 
 
The practice explores the ways in which notions of integration, diffusion, totality, and 
transduction can be both expressed and complicated within the viewer-painting-landscape 
dynamic. It does so through its representational and narrative subject matter (its depicted 
human subjects and natural settings); through certain formal treatments: (composition, tone, 
colour, facture, paint surface, repetition and variation); and through the particular orchestration 
of individual works into groupings; groupings into larger constellations; and larger 
constellations into a single unified exhibition. (The design of viewing sequences and spatial 
syntax is discussed in more detail in the Exhibition Display section, p.18). As will become 
evident, individual works are always conceived and developed both as discrete totalities (in the 
painter’s natural desire to resolve each picture as a single gestalt), but also as components 
within a larger system. The display thereby investigates the relationship between discrete 
elements and diffuse systems—between fragment and whole. Both subject matter and formal 
strategy, as the following sections discuss, re-enforce these concerns. The collective result 
perhaps, speaks to an appropriately paradoxical conception of the landscape as self-sufficient 
fragment. 
 
 
The Landscape Subject 
 
The primary vehicle for the practice-led investigations is the landscape motif itself. Landscape 
sites and settings were selected partly for their familiarity and proximity (the subject matter is 
drawn from locations close to where I work and study); partly because these sites were relatable 
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to 19th century realist landscapes for which I hold an affection; and partly because their 
physical/perceptual qualities resonated with the project’s research themes and questions. 
 
The works in the PhD exhibition focus upon a narrow spectrum of site-motifs with common 
morphological, perceptual, geographical, and art-historical features. In particular, the work 
responds to the modest pockets of semi-native bushland–neither rich in prospect or refuge 
– that are dotted around Melbourne’s outer-eastern suburbs. These are the familiar and yet 
somehow still alien plots of vernacular landscape that are compressed between residential and 
commercial developments, and the remnant and revegetated strips of low-lying green space that 
remain unsuitable for such developments. The responding studio works are accordingly far 
removed from the intense specticality of the landscape in its sublime form. Ostensibly too small 
and too discontinuous to function as coherent (eco)systems, these extant sites perhaps still 
required the work of the painter to convert land-stuff into land-scape. 
 
Indeed as the project developed, sites and motifs became increasingly selected for what they 
appeared to lack. Heroic scale, elevated views, expansive visual fields, unique geographical 
features, and deep spatial recession are largely absent from these sites and, in turn, from the 
studio works. Sky and horizon too are largely absent, stalling pictorial depth at what we 
subsequently read as the middle distance. Sites and motifs typically also lacked any obvious 
pictorial hierarchy and visual coherence. Distinctions between positive and negative space, and 
far and near objects, which the painter uses to construct the scene, are confounded by the 
relatively monotonous semi-opaque nature of the vegetation. The selection of sites and motifs 
therefore amplified tensions between the acts of observational recording and pictorial 
construction—between the “look and put” logic of the depictive enterprise and the 
requirements of pictorial sense-making. 
 
In their raw state these sites were typically captured as photographic reference material but were 
also resistant to photographic capture. Hence photographic source material served not as an 
antidote to the problem of representation but rather provided an inventory of scattered and 
competing fragments that needed to be edited, subdued and fused together via the wetware of 
painterly interpretation. Increasingly then, the character of the sites encouraged a greater degree 
of confabulation. The depictive process became a far more negotiated play between 
observational rendering and a process of conjuring form and space out of abstract passages of 
paint. Again, the practice research gravitated toward a range of motifs that seemed to require the 
analogue tools of brush and coloured mud to congeal the disparate elements into readable 
pictorial space. 
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The physical locations—the contemporary green spaces in and around Box Hill, Burwood, 
Blackburn, and along Gardiners Creek—also carried deep art-historical associations for the 
practice. The small but celebrated group of Australian landscape painters known as the 
Heidelberg School first began camping and painting en plein air in these outer-eastern suburbs 
of Melbourne between 1885 and 1889. (Topliss, 1984). Works such as Tom Roberts’ A Summer 
Morning Tiff c1886, The Artists’ Camp 1886 and A Sunday Afternoon Picnic at Box Hill 1887; 
Frederick McCubbin’s Lost 1886; Arthur Streeton’s Settler’s Camp 1888; and Jane Sutherland’s 
Obstruction Box Hill 1887 all capture the something of the landscape qualities described above 
in the PhD practice. The characteristic close-quarters approach to the landscape motif, as 
epitomised in the work of Roberts (1856-1931) and McCubbin’s (1855-1917) generate an 
intimate, private, and somewhat claustrophobic mood that resonates with the research project. 
Embodying Emile Zola’s notion of “beautiful oppositions” (a term he uses to describe Manet’s 
work) Robert’s and McCubbin’s Box Hill responses similarly seem enveloped but not 
enveloping, detached despite the viewer’s close proximity to the scene; silent and alien despite 
the familiarity and ordinariness of the motif; abruptly cropped and yet referring to nothing 
beyond the frame—nothing beyond the assembly space of the landscape stage. The closed view 
approach served, as it does in this body of work to crop out explicit references to residential and 
commercial developments that were, even then, encroaching upon the landscape motif from all 
sides (McCaughey, 2014; Topliss, 1984). The avoidance or removal of conspicuously built 
elements in the PhD landscapes further allowed for a comingling of different temporal registers 
and historical periods within the frame. 
 
The final exhibition’s geographical as well as aesthetic connection to the Heidelberg School is 
in turn linked to European art-historical developments of the mid 19th century. The French 
Realists and the Barbizon School of landscape painting (a loose fraternity of painters who 
converged upon Fontainebleau forest to paint en plein air) are important influences. These 
artists sought broadly to break with the rigid academic formulas that the royal academies had 
prescribed for landscape art. As abstractions or generalisations, those prescriptions (modelled 
on Poussin and Claude) displaced, Realists argued, the actual landscape, the real experience of 
responding to it, and the artist’s subjective presence as captured in the idiosyncratic materiality 
of the painted surface. Like the Australian Impressionists they influenced, the French Realists 
were motivated by a desire to respond to the landscape in ways that were at once both more 
objectively truthful, and yet also more intimate, experiential, and unselfconsciously subjective. 
By adopting an objective approach to the motif, the Realists believed that they would return the 
presence and trace of subjectivity that had been extinguished by such abstractions (Shiff, 2005). 
Hence along with more overt references to the Australian Heidelberg painters, French artists 
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such as Jean-Baptiste-Camille Corot, Gustave Courbet, Henri Rousseau, Jean-François Millet, 
and Édouard Manet circulate as diffuse but important influences. Traces of those 19th century 
French influences are discernible in the aesthetic register, motifs, and darkened tonal mood of 
the PhD exhibition but they are also detectable in various figurative elements. Poetic 
connections exist for example between the forensic motif in the PhD exhibition and Millet’s 
depictions of working peasants as immortalised in The Gleaners,1867 (Figure 4). Whether bent 
double as in the case of Millet’s The Gleaners or depicted on hands and knees as in Forensic 
Scene (Figure 2) and Reflection (Figure 3), each figure is bodily and optically absorbed in the 
landscape’s ground plane. As both forensic agent and peasant gleaners move systematically in 
search for remains and fragments along the ZY axes, we as viewers seek out the undivided and 
the whole along the XY axes of the pictorial plane (Figure1). As a thought experiment, the 
forensic motif teases out the variables of the encounter as a series of dialectical tensions 
embedded within the landscape idea: between the seemingly detached disembodied pictorial 
stance on one hand and the immersed insider dweller on the other. This re-orientation of figure 
to plane remixes expected sets of landscape relations and probes the viewer’s own frame of 
reference within the landscape system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2  Forensic  Scene Figure 3 Reflection (the glove) 
 
Figure 4 Jean-François Millet, The Gleaners, 1867 Figure 5 Edouard Manet, Le Déjeuner sur l’herbe 
(detail) 
 
 
 
In Reflection, an early work, the crime scene investigator’s bodily gestures (appropriated from 
photographic news footage) resonated with my own misremembering of Manet’s curious 
background bather in Le Dejeuner sur l’herbe, 1863 (see detail, Figure 5). In truth, Manet’s 
bather-figure bears little resemblance to the police investigator’s pose in anatomical terms and 
yet there is something in the implication of their analogously bent-over positions— their 
hinge-like engagement with both ground and pictorial planes; in the ambiguous objects of 
their respective visual attentions; in their allusions to the fragment, and in their sense of 
emergence (from water to land/from darkness to light), that opaquely links for me these two 
otherwise disparate figures. 
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Research Practices and Strategies 
 
Echoing these Realist sensibilities, the PhD studio project also began with a kind of default 
realism, albeit one already tuned to these 19th century sensibilities. Of course, as the Realists 
knew and indeed relied upon, a purely objective approach was neither possible nor desirable in 
its pure state. Concentrated observation served to return subjectivity without “aiming to do so” 
(Shiff, 2005, p. 763). Grounded on a process of an emerging and uncontrived subjective 
presence, the Realist’s approach could also be appropriated to generate an emerging rather than 
preconceived response to the PhD research questions. As the threat of contamination in the 
PhD exhibition similarly implies, detached observation threatens to rapidly transform into 
unintentional participation. The quasi-realist approach also became a concrete way to begin 
engaging with the landscape idea and the project’s otherwise abstract notions of integration, 
diffusion, totality, and transduction. 
 
Early stages of studio production proceeded as a mix of direct and indirect methods, combining 
on-site plein air work with studio painting from secondary photographic sources. The practice’s 
objective attitude is particularly evident in Gardiners Creek and Gardiners Creek 2 (Figure 6). 
The objective mood is amplified by the pairing of the two works which seems to accentuate the 
psychological distance between observer and observed. The reiteration of the motif at slightly 
different scales and angles heightens the feeling of visual scrutiny, as though we may be 
sceptically comparing two separate eyewitness testimonies, or calibrating the slight spatial, 
morphological, and temporal discrepancies between the two visual “recordings”. The repetition 
also heightens the unaccounted-for salience of the single landscape image which does not seem 
to warrant this redoubled optical attention. The motif hence seems to withhold or conceal 
something from the viewer that the act of reiteration does not remedy. The scene perhaps also 
lies close to a threshold zone at which the painting of the fragment begins to transform into a 
landscape. It is not obvious whether the depiction constitutes a landscape proper or rather blocks 
its possibility. The side-screen motif, or repoussoir4, itself a gesture of doubling, moreover 
monopolises as much as it frames the landscape scene. The quiet but persistent presence of 
these questions activate an otherwise conventional treatment of an otherwise conventional 
scene. 
 
 
 
 
4 In a two-dimensional work, a repoussoir is “an object along the right or left foreground that directs the viewer’s eye 
into the composition by bracketing (framing) the edge”. (Reviews, 2016)
- 9 - 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Gardiners Creek 2, and Gardiners Creek, Installation view 
 
 
As the studio project developed however, these “neutral” treatments of individual views became 
more analogous to the notion of gathering-together. While still moored to familiar depictive 
conventions and to the specificity of the physical sites, the studio process also became more 
constructed, more extemporised, and more permissive in its combination of source material. As 
visual material literally and haphazardly piled-up in the studio (paintings-in-progress, photos 
and printouts, observational drawings, plein air studies and other studio experiments) the 
resulting juxtapositions, and superimpositions of material inevitably became proceduralised into 
creative strategy. Similarly, within the digital development space photo references, art-historical 
sources, and digitally reproduced paintings accumulated and increasingly co-mingled within 
virtual folders and image-editing platforms. The mixing of source material across physical and 
digital workspaces became an iterative process in the studio work. Analogue paintings-in-
progress were typically re-immersed into the flux of digital source material only to be 
subsequently re- integrated back into the analogue material theatre of paint on canvas. 
Photographic reference material became only one of multiple source materials folded into the 
assembly process. The extended groping, revising marks of the paint brush served to interrupt 
the instant, objective, uniformly detailed surfaces of the photographic image and vice versa. Exit 
(Figure 7) in particular draws attention to the fusion of painterly and photographic languages. 
The chromatic grey palette implicates the photographic in its objective “black and white” 
documentary role, but the desaturation of colour also emphasises the idiosyncrasies of the paint 
surface and by extension the analogue (subjective and material) presence of the painter. Motifs 
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and source materials were stretched, reversed, doubled, extended, overlaid, fused, and otherwise 
altered and bound into a single scene. The method served partly to de-familiarize the raw visual 
material; partly to test out compositional possibilities; and partly to loosen the proprietorial hold 
that the photographic reference material can exert upon the painterly process of constructing 
and interpreting the landscape scene. Later works, such as Exit are constructed from multiple 
source materials including photographs, art-historical references, plein air studies, paintings of 
photographs, photographs of paintings, abstract gestures and pure painterly invention. 
 
The re-dialled and often unnatural tonal and colour profiles of the studio works are indicative of 
the image’s passing through the digital workspace on its way back to the analogue platform of 
the canvas and easel. As Chapter 4 discusses in more depth, the re-keying of tone and colour 
cast across imagery becomes an expression of the contingency of the image in the process of 
viewer reception and reproduction. Tint and tone also become analogous to consciousness itself 
as it permeates our other cognitive capacities: attention, memory, perception, sensation. Within 
the single work, colour cast and tone may be only dimly registered as the means by which form 
and space are modelled. The doubling of the image however, draws our attention to these 
elements as conceptual concerns. We see in tone and ambient colour the capacity to model 
forms but also to bind separate forms into a unified and diffuse whole. This material operation 
however, also seems inevitably to generate mood and hence becomes an operation analogous to 
the “hard problem”5 of consciousness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5  
5 The “hard problem” is a term coined by the Australian philosopher David Chalmers (1996). It encapsulates the 
ostensibly intractable problem of how it is that physical processes in the brain can give rise to subjective experience: a 
problem that seems to resist the interrogation of scientific methods. The term is itself a controversial one in conscious 
studies but has nonetheless become a broad term expressing the challenge of finding a scientific explanation for the 
datum of phenomenological consciousness. 
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Figure 7 Exit 
 
 
The accretion and mixing of material across digital and analogue workspaces encouraged a freer 
circulation of imagery and content. Paradoxically, this more assemblative approach to depicting 
the landscape did not de-territorialise the landscape image from its sense of site but rather 
redoubled the work’s connection to the original physical sites and their art-historical 
associations. This had much to do with the physical character of the sites themselves. With no 
visible horizon line and few explicit indications of linear perspective and uncertain vanishing 
points, the scene’s figurative elements, subjects, scales, temporal qualities, and subjects 
(depicted or otherwise) while not unmoored from perspectival logics, become subtly relaxed 
and more negotiable. The tight cropping of environment which logically points to its continuity 
beyond the frame does not press upon us phenomenologically. (Just as we are not aware of the 
expanse of information outside the spotlight of consciousness we similarly do not strongly 
register, even as absence, the world beyond the frame.) Such sites seem to fold inwards rather 
than recede toward the horizon imparting an enclosed stage-like quality. Within these 
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shallow stages, elements became transposable both within the pictorial workspace and “inter- 
textually” across different sites and source imagery. And by avoiding explicit reference to the 
built environment the landscape could also be more temporally mobile, slipping undetected 
between past and present and diffusing different time clippings. Such stage-like “assembly 
spaces” are no less apparent in those first open-air Heidelberg responses. McCubbin’s 
melancholy A Bush Burial,1890, for example, collages open grave, grieving couple, bushman- 
pastor, dog and cart onto the outdoor scene while the backdrop of soft foliage works like 
connective tissue to bind and diffuse the disparate elements into the scene (Figure 8). In such 
works, the specificity of the scene coexists alongside its constructed staginess. Unlike the 
standardised and more formal landscape stages of the picturesque convention modelled on 
Claude Lorrain (1600-1682) and Salvator Rosa (1615-1673), these improvised remnant-bush 
stages retain their specificity. 
 
 
Figure 8 Frederick McCubbin, A Bush Burial 1890 
 
 
As site choices and motifs in the practice research increasingly sought out the structureless and 
the chaotic (see Figure 8.1), the interpretive and confabulatory role of the artist-observer (as 
unifier of this visual confusion) became more active. In my attempts to solve the pragmatic 
problems of depiction and visual sense making, the strategies of the Heidelberg painters became 
increasingly salient. Thus subject matter, practice-led methodology, and art-historical dialogue 
became more intimately connected. These artists in turn took on a deepening presence in the 
work. Increasingly, fragments and motifs from these art-historical references are echoed within 
my own work, notably Frederick McCubbin’s Lost 1886 and Gathering Mistletoe 1886; Tom 
Roberts’ The Artists’ Camp 1886 and A Sunday Afternoon Picnic at Box Hill 1887; and Jane 
Sutherland’s Obstruction, Box Hill (1887). In some of the latter studio works, paintings by 
Roberts and McCubbin are explicitly cited. 
- 13 - 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Photographic reference, outer eastern suburbs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Afternoon picnic.. (detail) 
Exit and its variation, Return, for example, appropriate 
Roberts’ A Sunday Afternoon Picnic at Box Hill c1887 
(see Figure 10). The remakes lie somewhere between a re- 
inhabitation and a contamination of Roberts’ original 
scene. Substituting the picnicking couple (Figure 9) is a 
crew of forensic field agents ostensibly retiring from the 
search site: a gesture that feels paradoxically more 
mechanistic and de-subjectivised than the depiction of 
their forensic search activities on the land. The landscape 
stage, which seems to fold elements, including place and time ever-inwards, conspires however, 
to suspend their exit in perpetuity. The sense that there is no way out of the closed set also 
pervades Roberts’ and McCubbin’s treatment of the landscape, a quality that intensifies the lost- 
in-the-bush narrative. Consolidating the trace of the original inhabitants of the scene (invisible 
but still present), is the small detail of the dark-brown wine bottle. The forensic detail of the 
bottle (complete with DNA and finger prints) acts like a spatial and temporal reference point 
between the original and the studio remakes. The synthesis of the landscape motif, citation, 
narrative and the medium of paint, bind not only environmental and art-historical elements but 
diffuse a number of different temporal registers into the work: the momentary time of the 
original, the durational looping time as the figures walk out of the scene in perpetuity, the 
superimposed time of art-historical citation, the open, unresolved time of the painted surface 
which, unlike the photographic surface, remains perpetually open to revision. Other formal 
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interactions between tone, colour, paint, gesture, and surface stretch the temporality of the work 
from immediate to distant, even primordial, past. 
 
Figure 10 Exit Return Tom Roberts A Sunday, Afternoon 
Picnic at Box Hill c1887 
 
For the viewer, unaware of the project’s underlying research concerns, these aesthetic strategies 
and art-historical dialogues hopefully build a consistent phenomenological tone and coherent 
texture across the PhD exhibition. For the exegetical enquiry, the paintings produce a system of 
elements, variables, and interactions upon which to speculate. 
 
 
 
The Forensic Subject 
 
One of these elements is the forensic field agent (Figure11) introduced above. The in situ crime 
scene investigator searches within a carefully delineated location that is suspected of concealing 
human remains or other material evidence. At its most fundamental, the motif serves as a 
contemplation upon the nature of looking and the painter’s necessary pre-occupation with this 
act. The prioritisation of the optical in the work of the forensic investigator parallels that of the 
figurative painter. For while the forensic agent’s assignment is unlike the painter’s, both 
converge upon the object of attention with a patient and discriminating eye; both in some sense 
attempt to reconstruct the scene from an accumulation of fragments. The slowed-down, careful, 
extended form of visual address associated with the work of the forensic figure also suggests 
itself, perversely perhaps, as the painter’s ideal viewer. As a slow medium, painting demands 
substantial investments of the artist’s time and attention; in contradistinction, the viewer’s 
totalised all-at-once perception of the painting may be measured in a few brief seconds. The  
desire of the painter is to redress, however modestly, this asymmetry in relative investment. 
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The forensic presence thus becomes a musing upon the act and reception of painting and upon 
the painter’s desire to elicit a disciplined and durational form of looking from their audience. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Mutual Contamination 
(detail) 
More pointedly in the context of the project, the forensic motif 
activates Anderson’s notion of “gathering together” the 
historical, physical/material, mythological, ideological, and 
cultural dimensions of landscape. With its premise of the crime 
scene, the forensic motif implicates the missing and vanished 
subject and its material or indexical trace within the scene. So 
too, associations circulate around notions of contamination, the 
post-apocalyptic, and even the gothic. The implication of the 
forensic is underscored by the empirical realities of the 
Australian bush with its capacity to lure in and disorientate its 
interlocutors as evidenced by our regular news reports of missing tourists, bushwalkers and 
backpackers. Indeed, the forensic figure is most familiar to us in the form of imported “Crime 
Scene Investigation” (CSI) and “Cold Case” dramas that have colonised our television screens 
since the turn of the millennium: Forensic Files (1996-); Forensic Investigators; NCIS (2003-); 
CSI (2000-2015). CSI: Miami (2002–2012), CSI: New York (2004–2013), and CSI: Cyber 
(2015) to name a few. 
 
The forensic search scenario also enfolds the art-historical dimension, reconnecting with 
Australian lost-in-the-bush narratives. The theme of the lost subject, popular in Australian 
landscape painting and literature of the late 19th century, is epitomised in McCubbin’s 
Masterpiece, Lost, 1886. The forensic presence reorients the viewer’s imaginative focus upon 
this lost-in-the-bush narrative turning his/her view 180 degrees to observe the observer, and 
examine the positionality of the searcher of the lost subject. Like its 19th century forebear, the 
forensic presence introduces an element of narrative anxiety and disequilibrium into the scene 
as we are suspended in the uncertain outcome of the missing subject but also perhaps 
accompanied by uncertainties as to our own status and location within this rotated field of 
vision. In searching for the subject (via its index, trace, or correlation) the forensic presence 
becomes a generative metaphor for the research project itself and its effort to materialise the 
spectral presence of subjectivity in the landscape. 
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The Double 
 
Another important formal strategy in the practice is the act of remaking. The strategic repetition 
of the painted image is of course not new, either in modern or premodern art. Within the context 
of contemporary art, the gesture is a reflexive one, most commonly deployed to create doubt in 
the image, to destabilise our expectations of the painted image as a self-sufficient one-off 
creation and to interrogate notions of uniqueness, originality and authenticity6. In 
representational painting, the double is both the fundamental premise of the activity and an 
impossibility of the medium: to represent something real or imaginary is in some sense to create 
its double. The medium cannot double itself however, cannot replay its own gestures or retrace 
its own steps with accuracy. Embedded within the painted surface is nevertheless evidence of 
the painter’s habits, routine tricks and manoeuvres. Hence the painted double/the remake, 
reinforces the painted image’s status as an idiosyncratic one-off construction of rehashed 
gestures. 
 
Within the PhD investigation, the conspicuous repetition and variation of imagery (particularly 
through tonal “mood”) becomes an expression of the contingency of the static image as it is 
remade in the conscious moment. For regardless of whether the painting or “real” view is new 
or already familiar to the perceiving subject, the image (from a third-person perspective) is in 
some sense always both unique and rehashed as it is remade within the larger transient assembly 
process of consciousness. Re-synthesised within this neurological assembly process the image is 
remixed with other images, with pre-existing associations and fresh stimuli, with memories and 
future expectations. The unrepeat-ability of painting serves as a reminder that in the reception of 
the image—whether phenomenologically registered or not—no imaging technology reproduces 
itself verbatim. 
 
The remake also reminds us of the conspicuous presence of an illusion. While the single image 
invites the viewer to consume the illusion, the painted double/multiple can refocus our attention 
on illusion itself and its means of construction. Hence the painted multiple resonates with the 
project’s conception of landscape and consciousness as analogous kinds of illusion (real but not 
what they seem.) The contemplation of the illusion insinuates a gap between the material basis 
of the illusion and its end products. The tautology of the remake reinforces the obvious double 
 
6 In the “international” survey of contemporary painting, Vitamin P (Schwabsky 2002), for example, painterly 
duplication becomes, for painters such as Edefalk, “a means of emphasising the unique quality of painting” (in 
Schwabsky & Abts, 2002, p. 102). Edefalk’s attempts to obsessively repeat the painted image only serve to re- 
enforce the medium’s irreproducibility. For other artists such as Gabriele Di Matteo, painting’s inability to reproduce 
itself becomes a demonstration of the medium’s inadequacy within an age of digital reproduction (2002, p. 80). 
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status of the single image: on the one hand an illusion to be consumed and one the other a 
material construction that gives rise to the illusion. The discussions that follow this Prelude 
negotiate the uncertain interactions between these two “surfaces” of landscape and 
consciousness, and the explanatory gap they open up between the how-it-seems and how that 
seeming is produced. 
 
In this body of work, the repetition of imagery firstly emerged however from more personal or 
habitual studio practices. As a former intaglio printmaker, the production of multiple versions of 
the image was inseparable from the creative act. The reproductive technology of print media 
allowed the artist to run and re-run the experiment of the image open-endedly, changing certain 
variables while leaving others in place. Hence the double emerged as another way of 
investigating the landscape idea as a system of dynamic variables. These multiple versions and 
variations moreover, could  not only be compared side by side but presented side by side to 
form new composite works and larger landscape assemblies. 
 
These methodological impulses as a printmaker re-immerged in this painting-based project. 
Initially the act of repetition of paintings was a way interrogating a visual idea that seemed to 
have further potential. It was also the consequence of an artist’s conviction: “I can do this 
better”, akin to the writer redrafting a written document. Arnold Böcklin’s (1827-1901) series 
of Symbolist landscapes, Isle of the Dead of which he painted five versions between1880 to 
1886, serves as a salient art-historical precedent. While Böcklin’s motivation to repeat his 
Island-tomb motif was no doubt prompted by commercial interests—commissions remade into 
subsequent commissions—the remaking also allowed him to experiment with his pictorial idea: 
altering forms, content, colour, tone and even style from one version to the next. Significantly, 
Böcklin’s remakes also prompted revisions of previous versions7. As with Böcklin’s series, the 
methodology of repetition in this project inevitably precipitated changes to earlier versions. In 
the process, distinctions between original and remake, before and after, past and present, cause 
and effect became more distributed across the works. 
 
Unlike Böcklin’s remakes, the painted repetitions in the PhD exhibition are devised for 
simultaneous display. This combination of duplication and variation inevitably emphasises the 
temporal aspects of the work. Given the historical precedence of the repeated landscape 
painting, a number of pre-established readings assert themselves. One such reading, the same- 
 
 
7 The critical motif of the funeral boat, bearing a coffin, oarsman, and standing figure in white cloak was conceived 
in the second version at the prompting of a patron and  subsequently superimposed into the “original” version. 
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scene/different-time (or different season) convention is associated most famously with 
Monet’s impressionist landscapes as exemplified in his Haystacks series (1890-1891) and his 
Rouen Cathedral series painted in 1892-1894. These repainted scene/motifs allowed Monet to 
capture the fleeting effects of ambient light and colour as it played upon a (relatively) stable 
motif. We are also given to interpreting the repeated landscape image as sequential before and 
after frames—as per established visual narrative conventions. This narrative sense of 
landscape is particularly active in the Australian context given our obsession with the bush 
setting as  cinematic backdrop. As an indifferent and unforthcoming witness to an as yet 
unrevealed narrative, the “empty” landscape scene seems to take on a sentient presence of its 
own. The  insertion of the forensic presence in the landscape, with its presumption of  
disappearance, tragedy, and reconstruction further fuels narrative readings of the works and 
their syntax. 
 
 
 
The Exhibition Display 
 
While these temporal conventions circulate within the work, other studio treatments interfere 
with them and urge the viewer into a more open-ended interaction with the temporal and the 
spatial. In truth, the works are not responses to a landscape motif perceived at different times of 
day or season, nor are they produced or intentionally displayed in any narrative or chronological 
sequence. The syntax of the work; the intervals between works; and the final constellation of 
works into the exhibition are the result of more intuitive and provisional aesthetic assessments 
that are indifferent to narrative order. The presence of the repeated image also becomes an 
active and unpredictable force within the otherwise intentional process of exhibition design. If it 
is true that the goal of representation is not to simply reproduce its referent “like the second 
shoe of a pair” (Berger, 2018, p. 12), it is less clear whether the painted multiple attracts or 
resists its invitation to become the “other shoe”. This “push and pull” between multiples 
becomes a formal concern in the project but also a theoretical one. If both landscape and 
consciousness are defined as singular entities, as totalised spaces/experiences without 
remainder, then how is the double and the multiple reconciled with such a definition? Does the 
act of doubling create a newly combined twin-totality, an interrupted totality? A splintered or 
dispersed totality or merely separate mutually exclusive totalities? 
 
The unpredictability of, and variability in, the attractive or repulsive forces between the 
landscape image and its double generates a more contingent basis for display. Hence duplicates 
are variously arranged side-by-side, horizontally or vertically, interrupted by intervening 
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images, isolated, or amalgamated into larger assemblies and sequences (Figure12). This tends to 
set up formal and syntactic conventions which may prompt various readings (comparative,  
sequential, echoes and reverberations) only to alter them elsewhere in the exhibition. The 
organisation of work hence becomes another expression of the improvised assembly space of 
landscape and consciousness, not via any radical rethinking of gallery display but as a routine 
aspect of the painter designing an exhibition. Such forces support the intention to temper the 
narrative dimensions and avoid linear sequences in the design in a way that hopefully 
complicates and enlivens the reception of individual works and their relationships with other 
works within the installation. 
 
 
 
Figure 12  Installation views, Counihan Gallery, 2018
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Landscape and Consciousness 
 
Finally, and in a more speculative vein, neuroscientific research into  mind and consciousness 
suggest other resonances for the double.  Do all landscape images already function as 
unaccounted-for duplications in the context of the brain?  Just as synthetic drugs work not by 
exposing the brain to unfamiliar chemicals but by mimicking the brain’s own natural neuro-
chemical processes, does the landscape image mimic certain neurological procedures in the 
brain?  Does the painted landscape (the “readymade” landscape) insinuate itself into the mind’s 
own process of reconstructing mental images of past events and their environmental context? 
Can landscape’s more durable phenomenal effects: its sense of nostalgia, loss, melancholy, its 
seemingly personal relevance, be better explained as an entanglement with these cognitive 
processes?  Seemingly significant but implacably so, the landscape depiction prompts an 
internal search for an event/encounter in memory that never occurred.  Reconsidered in the 
context of the brain, the landscape image/experience, déjà vu like, offers itself up as the context 
of a prior event but one that cannot be matched to a corresponding event in the viewer’s 
memory. The intentionality of painting in turn reinforces this opaque salience, as Koerner 
expresses, “I believe, because it is a painted scene, that it is somehow for [me], and that 
insignificant nature represented, will have a bearing on [my] life” (1990, p. 12).  
 
The speculations above ultimately centre on the mysterious relationships between material 
processes and subjective qualities. Why are these processes of gathering, binding, diffusing, 
and totalising also accompanied by a mood— by a seemingly immaterial subjective dimension? 
It is to questions of how processes of consciousness connect with processes of landscape that 
the next sections explore as further theoretical underpinning of the practice-led project. 
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2. Context and Concepts 
 
The claustrum is a small but highly networked structure hidden inside the insular cortex of the 
mammalian brain. Receiving inputs from widely dispersed cortical regions and from temporally 
and spatially dispersed sensory inputs, the claustrum also sends out signals to almost all areas of 
the cortex in cycles measured in fractions of a second. Its function, Crick and Koch (2005) 
postulate, is to facilitate a process whereby neural activity is rapidly extracted, bound together 
and redistributed back into the cortex in a unified and synchronized way (2005, p. 1277). Given 
these operations and timescales, Crick and Koch posit that the claustrum may be correlated to a 
key feature of experience: our conscious moments, despite being constructed from multiple 
disparate inputs are nevertheless experienced simultaneously and indivisibly such that we are 
“not aware of many isolated percepts but of a single unifying experience” (Crick 2005:1276). 
The function of the claustrum may suggest an explanation as to why our conscious moments are 
furnished by elements that are in fact differentiated and specific and yet phenomenologically 
diffuse8 and “all at once”. 
 
In 1913, Georg Simmel (1858 -1918) pursued a similar line of reasoning in his Philosophy of 
Landscape. A landscape, Simmel argued, occurs when the list of particulars we might observe 
within a natural setting - a patch of earth, an expanse of sky, a body of water, a dwelling, a 
distant figure and anything else that falls under our gaze - are no longer perceived as so many 
separate elements but rather as an “all-encompassing and diffused totality” (Simmel, 2007). 
When this transformation occurs, when we experience a “landscape”, rather than a mere 
collection of individual objects, “we have a work of art in statu nascendi”—in its original form 
(Simmel, 2007, p. 25). For Simmel, this totalising process, or Stimmung, involves more than 
merely integrating environmental data but entails a diffusion of the whole external scene with 
the subject’s own state of mind. We are distanced from environment only to be folded back into 
it in a more profound way. As this seemingly instantaneous diffusion of mind, (body) and 
environment takes place, we become, Simmel suggests, dimly aware of this process of diffusion 
as a phenomenal quality of the encounter. Simmel proposes that the underlying “opaque mood” 
of landscape is just this binding/integrating/diffusing process “viewed from a different angle” 
(Simmel, 2007, p. 27). 
 
 
 
8 For example in perceiving a red ball we experience all of its sensory qualities at once— its colour, shape, and if we 
are holding it, its tactile qualities. It is impossible, it seems, to experience one aspect of the ball without also 
experiencing all of its other available qualities. 
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Despite the distant contexts these two papers emerge from, the resonances between them are 
readily apparent. Both invite us to reconsider their topics less as objects than as processes. On 
these views, neural activity is transformed into conscious experience as world-stuff is 
transformed into landscape: through similar processes of extraction, assembly, integration, 
diffusion and re-integration. While Crick and Koch’s collaboration attempts to identify neural 
structures and activities that could potentially “give rise” to consciousness, Simmel’s 
examination suggests a particular kind of encounter whereby the underlying processes not only 
produce the experience but become opaquely registered as an aspect of that experience. In both 
studies, this emphasis on process becomes a means by which to negotiate the epistemological 
divide between the objective material surfaces and the seemingly immaterial subjective surfaces 
of their topic. Both studies attempt to move some way toward reconciling these views from 
different angles. 
 
 
 
The Project 
 
The impetus for this project has arisen in large part out of a curiosity in these analogous 
problem spaces. If consciousness research is the scientific and philosophical effort to find 
explanations for the relationship between subjective experience and physical matter, between 
self and world, then those efforts may also be relevant to the ongoing project of making, and 
making sense of landscape. By engaging with the context of the brain these discussions explore 
the ways that first-person accounts of landscape may be deepened by third-person 
investigations of consciousness which seek to find the correlating structures, mechanisms and 
underlying processes of subjectivity. The practice-led research informs and is informed by this 
multi- disciplinary context. 
 
 
 
Thesis Questions 
 
What are the interactions between the landscape idea and consciousness? How do our 
conceptions of landscape interact with conceptions of consciousness and the self? How might a 
21st century understanding of consciousness contribute to our understanding of the landscape 
idea and what role can the tradition of painting play in directing these questions? 
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Landscape Research in the Visual Arts 
 
Landscape in Western art9 does not suggest itself as a pressing topic for contemporary research. 
Indeed, landscape seems to intrinsically resist any alignment with notions of the contemporary. 
This in itself reveals something about the affective byproducts of landscape. As the Prelude 
speculated, the landscape’s elegiac moods, its sentimentalism, its sense of melancholy, loss and 
longing, are perhaps not merely themes folded in but more deeply entangled with conscious 
processes and cognition. Landscape’s forte seems to lie in its capacity to tranquilize and comfort 
rather than critically engage. Indeed, to picture tranquility is to all but picture one’s self in 
relation to a natural outdoor scene. Rise and fall Art-historical narratives also reinforce (and 
perhaps misattribute) landscape’s seemingly in-built out-of-dateness. Landscape, we were told 
(Kenneth Clark, 1979), first emerged as an art form in the early 15th century where it 
subsequently developed into an independent genre by the 17th. Then, overturning traditional 
hierarchies of genre, landscape reached its eminent status at some point in the 19th century 
where it henceforth slid into an inevitable and permanent decline in the 20th (at least as a 
pictorial practice in the visual arts). Within such a framework, landscape’s widespread 
popularity paradoxically only served to confirm its status as an outmoded genre abandoned to 
the amateur enthusiast. 
 
Landscape’s putative status as an obsolete genre is undermined however by a great many 
contemporary artists engaged with the tradition of depicting the land. Landscape-based painter 
such as: Peter Doig (UK), George Shaw (UK); Stephen Bush (Australia); Mamma Andersson 
(Sweden); Neo Rauch, David Schnell, Tilo Baumgärtel and Gerhard Richter (all from 
Germany); Wilhelm Sasnal (Poland); Hernan Bas (USA); and Jia Aili (China) for example, 
have received immense critical success internationally. This has not led to an equally robust re- 
engagement with landscape depiction in contemporary art discourse however10.  
 
9 The land-based traditions of Australian Indigenous art are conspicuously absent in these discussions partly for 
reasons of scope and partly to avoid conceptual and terminological confusion. Other great landscape traditions that 
would undoubtedly have much to contribute to these discussion (notably China) are absent for the same reason. 
 
10 Elgar’s monograph Gerhard Richter: landscapes (1998), for example, curiously provides little discussion of 
landscape in the accompanying texts. Were one to swap-out the landscape reproductions for other motifs, the 
monograph’s text would require little alteration. Similarly, as Godfrey (2009, p. 237) notes of Malcolm Andrew’s 
(1999) otherwise excellent volume Landscape in Western Art,  Andrew’s all but ignores painting produced after 
the19th century as though the medium had been literally buried once-and-for-all by the land art movements of the 
1960s. So too, Norbert Wolf’s historical survey Landscape Painting, (Wolf & Gabriel, 2008) contains only two works 
made after the modernist period, including a paint-by-numbers parody by Warhol (an artist who had no discernable 
interest in landscape) from his Do It Yourself series exhibited 1962. 
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Hence ambitious practitioners continue to engage with the idea of landscape in the absence 
of such discourse. It would seem, as Godfrey feigns, that we “must look elsewhere for 
critical work” (2009, p. 237). 
 
These art-historical circumstances inevitably weigh on the consciousness of the project. The 
practice-led research remains attached, via its choice of medium and methods, to an immensely 
rich if problematical history of depicting the land with its great works but also its well-worn 
tropes and ideological entanglements. The research practice does not attempt to distance itself 
from these apparently outmoded historical practices, engaging with the art-historical and 
aesthetic legacies of the French realists and the Australian Heidelberg school. As the Prelude 
articulates, the artists’ camps these Melbourne-based painters first established in Box Hill in the 
late 19th century interact with the project’s research questions and permeate the aesthetic mood 
of the final exhibition. 
 
 
 
Treatments of Subjectivity in Landscape Research 
 
The subject of the subject has been a contentious element in the development of the landscape 
idea. For the Romantics, landscape served as the pre-eminent vehicle via which the self and 
consciousness could be examined or transformed. Objectivist approaches to landscape research 
in the 1950s alternatively deemed subjectivity to be irrelevant, instead focusing strictly on the 
land’s physical characteristics. First-person perspectives returned with force however in the 
Humanist and Phenomenologist geographies of the 1970s11 This reaffirmation of subjectivity is 
once again disavowed by subsequent Marxist critiques that emerged in the early 1980s. More 
radically still, Post-structuralist and Postmodern readings of the landscape attempted to “write 
off” subjecthood entirely by recasting it as a by-product of language, as discussed in the 
following chapter. 
 
Much of the history of landscape has revolved around questions of how to situate the subject or 
“non-subject”. We may break, for the sake of parsimony, this relationship between landscape 
and the subject in two main approaches: those who would want to define landscape in terms of 
embodied practices and dwelt-in places (Buttimer, 1976; Ingold, 2012; Lorimer, 2005; Kenneth 
R. Olwig, 1996; Thrift, 2008; Wylie, 2007) and those who would assert that we only appreciate 
 
 
 
 
11 Central figures include Tuan, Relp, Mercer and Powell, Gregory, Buttimer, Ley (read Jackson, 1981). 
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landscape because it is separate from us; that landscape only becomes so at the moment we 
become uncoupled from the pragmatics of land use and adopt the stance of the disinterested 
outsider. (K. Clark, 1956; D. Cosgrove, 1985; Stephen Daniels, 1985b; Gobster, 1999; D. 
Lowenthal, 1968; Mitchell, 2002). As subjects we in turn may be imagined as insider- 
participants folded into the everyday “lifeworld” of the landscape (Buttimer, 1976; Husserl, 
1970); as inhabitants engaged in “everyday routines, fleeting encounters, [and] embodied 
movements…” (Lorimer, 2005, p. 84); or as observer-spectators who (in an awe-struck, 
enraptured, contemplative, or day-dreaming state), gaze out upon the landscape from behind 
some physical or psychological barrier. 
 
Recent landscape discourse has seen another return (of sorts) to the datum of consciousness and 
to related capacities such as affect, memory, intentionality, and agency. As discussed in chapter 
5, this renewed interest in deeper content beyond immaterial language and power games—has 
not been allied with a 21st century scientific and philosophical engagement with consciousness 
in the context of the mind however. Indeed, just as the cognitive, biological and physical 
sciences experienced an explosion of interest in the problem of consciousness since the 1990s 
(the “decade of the brain”): cultural geography, the visual arts, and the humanities generally, 
became possessed by radically different intellectual agendas. Hence any consideration of 
human experience and behaviour beyond purely ideological, linguistic, or otherwise socio- 
constructivist terms was anathema. Even as the hegemony of these frameworks has receded, a 
reluctance to engage with consciousness in the substantive context of the brain remains. 
 
 
 
Scope and Contribution 
 
This project investigates the potential for new knowledge around landscape through a 
reconsideration of subjectivity; one that takes seriously the context of the brain. As a practice- 
led project, the research outcomes will be particularly relevant in the context of representational 
landscape painting in the Australian context. It will be also be relevant to researchers and 
practitioners across a number of disciplines for whom the cross-disciplinary idea of landscape 
remains important. Hence the discussion circulates within a wider research culture including 
cognate disciplines: art history, art theory and aesthetics; related fields: human and cultural 
geography, as well as more distant fields such as environmental and evolutionary psychology, 
ecology, garden design, landscape architecture, and anthropology. 
 
The project is also contextualised within a network of scholars and practitioners interested in the 
nature of consciousness, exemplified by the contributors to the Journal of Consciousness, 
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Theatre, Literature and the Arts. The journal and its associated international conference and 
publication activities engage “with a wide variety of areas, problems, and applications within 
the broad field of consciousness studies in relation to literature and the arts” (Meyer-Dinkgräfe). 
In this context, landscape’s particular enmeshments with the problem of consciousness serve as 
a case study that may find resonances with other creative fields and disciplines. 
 
While arts-researchers as professional producers and designers of experience may well 
contribute to broader discussions around the nature and ontology of consciousness, this project 
restricts its scope to the ongoing project of making and speculating upon landscape. It does not 
proffer any novel contribution to consciousness literature. Despite this delimitation of scope, 
anxieties are inevitably triggered when researchers work across the arts-science divide. For 
regardless of the artist-researcher’s lack of training as an art historian, sociologist, philosopher, 
ethical theorist, or social scientist, encroachments into these fields generally require little 
justification and indeed may be almost obligatory within certain intellectual trends. It is not 
clear however that such cognate disciplines allied through historical accident, will necessarily 
be more relevant (or even more intelligible) to the arts-researcher’s interests. As the 
introductory passage starkly illustrates, Simmel’s philosophy of landscape written over a 
century ago finds new synergies not with current visual arts writing but with current 
neuroscience research. Given the vast, inter-connected databases of knowledge now available 
to researchers, what we deem to be cognate must surely depend on the nature of the specific 
enquiry. And while the frequent misuse of scientific concepts within the arts and humanities— 
as well as the sometimes naive treatments of the arts by scientific researchers—is cause for 
caution, it is also a call to improve the dialogue. This project contributes to new knowledge 
through a re-examination of the landscape idea by developing a novel synthesis of perspectives 
drawn from the visual arts, landscape, and consciousness research. 
 
 
 
Research Model 
 
This project adopts the practice-exegesis paradigm. Itself a relatively recent interdisciplinary 
experiment within the academy, the practice-exegesis model is premised on the notion of new 
knowledge production though a nexus of scholarly writing and reflexive art practice. The 
relationship between these two components however is “far from obvious” (Milech; & Schilo, 
2004, p. 1). This project is influenced by Milech’s Research Question Model which 
conceptualizes “writing and practice…as complimentary but independent articulations of a 
single research question and a related set of research objectives” (2004, p. 1). The Research 
Question Model then diverges somewhat from prevailing, essentially scriptural notions of the 
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exegesis as “a critical explanation or interpretation of a text” (Merriam Webster's). The idea that 
one component (the exegesis) serves as the designated commentary upon the other (the studio 
practice) is reframed in the Research Question Model as allied investigations directed toward a 
shared research question. Within this triangulated structure of the Research Question Model, the 
project seeks to avoid a binary relationship where one component constitutes the research and 
the other mere commentary or explication of the research. Practice and writing possess their 
own language, processes, and ways of knowing and to some extent their own conclusions. 
 
As Milech and Schilo acknowledge however, the Research Question model, like all models, is 
an abstraction, its triangular geometry inevitably reshaped by real-world negotiations between 
practice and writing. While the practical component may be (more or less) directed toward a 
research question, its outcomes cannot be made to converge neatly with the exegetical enquiry 
without also compromising the very nature of practice as a research method. The project 
nevertheless finds the non-binary premise of the Research Question Model valuable in guiding 
(rather than prescribing) the relationship between practice and exegesis. Creative practice 
(probably) can’t be pressed into the service of a single predetermined research question; it can 
however overlap with that question and with the methodology of scholarly writing in productive 
ways. 
 
Within this allied relationship the written word is undoubtedly more equipped to investigate the 
research question explicitly through an engagement with the literature. The practice however, 
operates in a necessarily more ambiguous and underdetermined way within the problem space. 
While the project’s engagement with landscape themes are manifest through literal depictions of 
the land, its concern with consciousness requires exegetical support. This is not surprising given 
we lack a truly meaningful representation of consciousness beyond metaphor: mists, variously 
illuminated transparent brains, neon-coloured neural networks shooting bolts of energy, and so 
on. In this respect, the studio project is not interested in expressing folk-psychological notions 
of consciousness for the viewer. Rather, a s stated in the Prelude, the studio project focuses on 
the special conditions of the landscape encounter and explores the interactions between its 
subjects, scenes, and surfaces.  
 
The previous section (Prelude) specifically frames the development of the practice: its  
developing methodologies, its major themes and concepts, its art-historical connections; its 
organization; and its interpretive framework. Following on from this chapters’ framing of the 
theoretical field of enquiry, the next chapter (Chapter 3) looks to build a theoretical and 
historical account of subjectivity in landscape research of the recent past. It canvases a period of 
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theorising in which the previously separate disciplines of geography and the visual arts 
converge and where landscape emerges as a key concept not only within these disciplines but 
within the humanities more broadly. Chapter 3 consists principally of an interpretation and 
synthesis of relevant literature that has been prompted and complicated by certain studio works 
which function as thought experiments. As substantive works and as provocations or 
promptings for theoretical speculation, these thought experiments are important elements within 
the project. They are not necessarily included within the final exhibition however. Dalek in the 
Landscape functions in precisely this role in Chapter 3 where the material and visual 
concreteness of the image inevitably complicates and challenges the literature along with the 
artist-researcher’s attempts to theorise from it. In this role, the practice often re-orientates or 
frames the problem of the subject’s relationship to the landscape in novel and confounding 
ways. 
 
Chapter 4 canvasses more recent engagements with subjectivity and introduces insights from 
the disciplines of consciousness science and philosophy of mind. Discussion of the practice is 
folded in to these sections to elide the consistent inter-play between practice and the scholarly 
field. By explicating a specific model of consciousness, Chapter 4 speculates on the interactions 
between subjects, consciousness and landscapes in a more concrete way. It links consciousness 
research to specific strategies adopted in the practice. This discussion is extended in Chapter 5 
which further explores and speculates upon the variables at play within the landscape encounter. 
It explores the dynamics between the sense of self and the landscape idea through a comparison 
of two works: Casper David Friedrich’s The Wanderer Above a Sea of Fog (1818) and a 
keystone work within the exhibition: Mutual contamination. 
 
 
 
Brief Overview of Landscape and Consciousness (Definitions) 
 
Landscape 
 
As we saw in Simmel’s early 20th century formulation, landscape may be defined as a process 
whereby subject and “natural” scenery are in some sense bound together as a diffuse whole. 
While Simmel does not define “natural” it seems clear that he means to summon to mind those 
morphological features that we at least perceive as natural, that have the aspect of nature: 
woods, mountains, sky, fields, rivers, etc. within an external scene. Simmel sets out clearly 
however, the difference between “nature” and “landscape” in a way that usefully delimits the 
discussion. If nature is an “uninterrupted creation and destruction of forms” (Simmel, 2007, p. 
21), then the idea of a section of nature bracketed off from this indivisible flux is self- 
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contradictory. Hence while we may intimately associate landscape with nature, the two terms 
are, on this reading, conceptually distinct and even contradictory. A fragment of nature that 
subjectively appears to possess its own indivisible wholeness, Simmel argues, “demands a 
status for itself” (Simmel, 2007, p. 21). This status we call landscape. 
 
Today, the term operates within a complex web of academic disciplines and theoretical 
frameworks. Within the Visual Arts and Geography, landscape has been examined as: a brut 
physical fact (Sauer, Denevan, & Mathewson, 2009); a product of cultural and aesthetic tastes 
(David Lowenthal, 2007; D. Lowenthal & Prince, 1965); a medium of ideological transference 
(Barrell, 1983; D. Cosgrove & S. Daniels, 1988; S. Daniels, 1989; James Duncan & Duncan, 
1992); an expression of larger regimes of power and control (Mitchell, 2002); polity (Knowles, 
1983; K. R. Olwig, 2002); and a substrate for historical memory and cultural inscription 
(Schama, 1995). As Waage reminds, landscape is also an idea used and practiced by everyone 
(2012, p. 45). O’keeffe describes landscape no less than an inalienable democratic value that 
“…everybody knows, possesses and partakes in” (2007, p. 4). Landscape experiences are also 
shaped by our common natural history as a species—shaped by our evolved habitat preferences 
(see Appleton, 1975; Dutton, 2009; Kaplan, Kaplan, & Brown, 1989). 
 
Given the many competing and overlapping perspectives on landscape, the term has 
unsurprisingly vexed scholars attempting to establish clear parameters. As Elkins concludes: “It 
seems to me just possible that landscape…is an intractable subject for scholarship” [and] “of all 
the subjects in the Art Seminar series, this one may be the most desperately confused” (2008, 
pp. 69,88). These intractabilities however are also a creative resource, allowing for new 
conflations, entanglements, and connections. The following discussions nevertheless keep in 
view entirely familiar notions of the term grounded in everyday usage. Indeed, the project is 
interested more in how we use the term landscape than in prescribing how we should use it. 
Discussions are therefore more analytical and speculative than judicial in tone. These 
vernacular uses of the term landscape, as captured in standard dictionary definitions, typically 
set out some variation of the following three senses: 
 
1. “A portion of land or territory which the eye can comprehend in a single view, including all the 
objects it contains”. 
2. “A picture of a section or expanse of territory that can be seen from a single view” 12 
And as verb: 
3. “To adorn or improve (a section of ground) by contouring and by planting flowers, shrubs, or trees”.13 
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As with Simmel’s conception, we have in these senses of landscape an emphasis on the totalised 
view. [The compatability between prevailing definitions and Simmel’s conception is not 
surprising given the philosopher’s influence in shaping subsequent theorizations of landscape 
(Pagano, 2011,p. 404)]. While Simmel evokes a more pervasive psychological exchange, 
captured by the notion of the Stimmung, we nevertheless have the same notion of an interaction 
between a subject and an expanse of natural territory. As these first two entries suggest, 
landscape may involve us in either “direct” or “mediated” encounters with natural spaces. They 
may involve us in widely diverse kinds and scales of environment —from “remote” wilderness to 
the local “beauty spot”; from vast expanses to the abbreviated green spaces nested inside 
suburbia which become the focus of the studio-led research. 
 
Despite the definition’s narrow emphasis upon scenic processes14, we nevertheless have a 
composite idea of landscape as physical territory; as a representation of territory; and as the 
physical process of transforming the land for its visual amenity. While these three senses can be 
discretely separated on the page, in the processes of making and encountering landscapes they 
inevitably become amalgamations  of “direct” and “mediated”, “real” and “simulated”, 
“remote” and “everyday”. Distinct amongst art-historical genres, landscape slips, often 
unnoticed, between pragmatic matters of land use and occupation on the one hand, and the 
symbolic, aesthetic, and philosophical realms of art and aesthetics on the other. This 
entanglement of the dwelt-in and the pictorial is not present to such an extent in other genres. As 
Kelsey puts it, “we do not call a person a portrait, or a plate of food at dinner a still life” (2008, 
205). The ambiguities inherent in this standard definition is all we require to consider landscape 
in more dynamic ways. Defined in these vernacular terms, there is no landscape without the 
participation of a subject to perceive them—a subject who can be relied upon to entangle these 
different senses. The requirement of a subject/perceiver also implicates consciousness as an 
immanent consideration. 
 
 
 
12 Dictionary definition: http://www.brainyquote.com/words/la/landscape183500.html 
13 definition from http://www.thefreedictionary.com/landscape 
14 As discussed in Chapter 3, this essentially “artist’s sense of landscape” as Turner (1983, p. 180) calls it, is by no 
means a neutral one. More recent trends in landscape have generally sort to challenge formulations of landscape that 
are too narrowly associated with the pictorial—with something “merely” viewed or shaped for improved viewing. 
Current vernacular definitions are criticised for equating “scape” with “scope”— a technology for remote and 
distanciated viewing. Much of the literature’s preoccupation with etymology (with the suffix “scape” deriving 
variously from scap, skip, skipe, shaft, shaffen skapr, skabe, etc.) serves to return the idea to earlier displaced 
meanings. Olwig (1996), most notably, excavates the term landschaft which encompasses the social and 
administrative dimensions of the land: its customs, culture, polity and law. 
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Consciousness: first and third-person perspectives 
 
Like landscape, the word “consciousness” is one we spontaneously recognize and intuitively 
grasp but find deeply puzzling upon closer examination. And like landscape, consciousness too 
is considered by some to be an intractable subject for scholarship. Indeed, from the perspective 
of Mysterianism (see McGinn, 1991), consciousness remains forever beyond the limits of the 
human mind to comprehend. 
 
As most researchers concede (see S. Greenfield, 2007), consciousness cannot yet be formally 
defined. There is no consensus on what kind of “phenomena” consciousness is (joy is an 
emotion, a banana is a kind of fruit, consciousness is a…?), or what it does (a hammer is a tool 
for hitting things; the liver is an organ for removing toxins in the blood, consciousness is a 
“thing” for …?). At the same time however, consciousness, experience itself, is “the most 
familiar thing there is […] the only thing in the Universe whose ultimate intrinsic nature we can 
claim to know” (Strawson, 2016, p. 1). It is “the water in which we swim” (Bernard J. Baars, 
2012, p. 288). Indeed, as Descartes (1596 –1650) first argued, the sense that there at least seems 
to be this inner life is the only thing we can be sure of because our very doubting of it only 
confirms its existence. We feel confident about the existence of our own subjectivity but we 
also reasonably assume that others possess an “inner life” too. We intuit this by listening to 
other people’s reports and by observing their behaviour. We also infer that consciousness is a 
universal human capacity because we share so many other universal physical and psychological 
capacities with our fellow humans and non-human cousins. In the absence of formal 
definitions, this insider sense of what it means to be conscious, and by extrapolation, what it 
means for other sentient beings to be conscious, affords us with a common appreciation and 
functional definition of the term. 
 
One criticism however (see Block, 1997; Sloman, 1991) is that the term “consciousness” 
conflates many different mental phenomena (such as awakeness, awareness, attention, 
perception, introspection, self-consciousness, reportability, free will, affect, the mind, and 
even knowledge) for one: 
 People who discuss consciousness delude themselves in thinking that they know what they are 
talking about. I don’t claim that there is nothing they are talking about. Rather, it is not just one 
thing, but many different things muddled together. (Sloman, 1991, p. 2) 
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As Champagne counters however, nor should we carve “consciousness at the joints too deeply” 
(2009, p. 169). The “hard problem” of consciousness, as Chalmers (1996) famously described 
it, is not in understanding awareness or access or memory or attention, or perception per se, or 
indeed in differentiating them, but rather in how it is that all of these discrete mental activities 
can be diffused with a qualitative dimension. 
 
By “consciousness” then, these discussions focus on the seemingly irreducible qualitative 
dimension that permeates these other mental phenomena but is not reducible to any one of them. 
This qualitative dimension of our existence is commonly referred to as phenomenological 
consciousness or “P consciousness”. Nagel’s (1974) expression of a “something it is like” 
perhaps gives still the best description of P consciousness. Put simply, an entity is conscious if 
there is something it is like to be that entity and not conscious if there is not. This deceptively 
simple notion of a something-it-is-like remains useful both for expressing what we mean by P 
consciousness and intuiting what kinds of things are likely to have it. As Nagel’s phrase infers 
however, consciousness has little purchase without an accompanying sense of a subject— an “I” 
who “owns” these experiences and a “me” to whom these experiences happen. While the 
content of consciousness clearly feels impermanent and fleeting, there seems also to be a 
durable and continuous presence, a residing self that is the receiver and a proprietor of 
experiences. When we lose consciousness in dreamless sleep we feel as though we are this same 
self upon awakening. In this discussion, the term sense of self is not equated with the narrower 
notion of self-awareness. The sense of self rather is this personalised point of view that seems to 
permeate experience. 
 
What consciousness and the sense of self feels like from the inside however has also 
confounded our efforts to understand it objectively. First-person perspectives tell us with 
confidence what consciousness is like but potentially nothing about how it is generated. For 
example, we may feel like a single self centred somewhere behind our eyes, however what we 
find in the brain is many parallel processes of which we are mostly unaware and with no such 
centre in which an experiencing self “comes together”. To make sense of consciousness we 
must go beyond phenomenology’s emphasis on having, noticing, describing and comparing our 
experiences. Hence, to understand subjectivity in the context of landscape we must also go 
beyond phenomenology and its various reboots. Materialist approaches to consciousness, and 
neuro-scientific approaches attempt to locate causes (or at least correlations) of consciousness 
which might ultimately explain how non-conscious matter gives rise to consciousness and its 
qualitative texture (its informativeness, its singularness, its specificity yet also its unity, etc.). 
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While still speculative, materialist approaches are grounded on a vast accumulation of insights 
into the brain-body and its workings. The exegetical discussion assumes the following basic 
suppositions based on this accumulated, yet obviously incomplete knowledge of the mind, 
brain, and physical matter. 
 
1. Consciousness exists. 
2. We are yet to encounter a consciousness (so far) that does not yet rely upon the presence of a 
functioning brain that is in turn embedded within a living body (Sullivan, 2006). 
3. Consciousness is not supernatural but rather a natural phenomenon arising, like everything else, 
through material interactions. In short, “consciousness, is wholly a matter of physical goings-on” 
(Strawson, 2016, p. 1); 
4. Consciousness and the sense of self is not inventions of Romanticism or some other merely 
cultural construct but evolutionary adaptations in biological systems capable of intentional 
movement through environments. Consciousness and the sense of self facilitate our pragmatic 
bodily transactions in the world (Damasio, 2010), and play a causal role15 in negotiating and 
guiding our bodies safely through the physical world (Revonsuo, 2010). 
 
While constituting a strong consensus within the field, these suppositions nevertheless include a 
large spectrum of theories for which this project remains agnostic. Indeed, the broader strategy 
of searching for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is largely theoretically neutral 
beyond the assumption of the brain’s necessary involvement. As most researchers concede, 
there is more than enough uncertainty to remain open to alternative theories. Where the exegesis 
draws on specific models, notably Susan Greenfield’s neuronal assembly theory, it is as a means 
of providing a more tangible framework for speculation, not an argument for adopting any 
specific theory. The only necessary premise the reader need acknowledge is that brains and 
consciousness are linked, to say the least, in non-trivial ways. 
 
As we shall see in the following chapter, the various recent critical perspectives used to theorize 
landscape in recent decades have in one way or another attempted to cast doubt upon the active 
presence of consciousness. It asks: how has subjectivity been formulated and reformulated in 
various theorizations of landscape of the recent past? 
 
 
 
 
 
15 “Patients who lose conscious information but retain similar nonconscious information are deeply incapacitated in 
their dealings and interactions with the world” (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 283). 
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3: The Dalek: Anti-Subjectivism and the Spectral Presence 
of the Subject 
 
Why is consciousness a spectral presence in landscape research? This chapter provides a 
contextual foundation for the ways in which consciousness circulates with other variables 
within the landscape idea and in turn within the research project. It develops an analysis of 
subjectivity and subjecthood in landscape discourse and canvases landscape’s various 
treatments of, and attitudes towards, the problem of subjectivity in recent decades. Focusing on 
the dominant theoretical trends transforming landscape discussion within the Visual Arts and 
Geography, the chapter provides an explanation of why a 21st century consideration of 
consciousness remains largely excluded from those disciplinary discussions. I begin firstly 
with a speculation upon one of my own paintings as a way of presaging the discussion that 
follows. 
 
Dalek in the Landscape (Figure13), an early work in the practice research (not included in the 
final exhibition) insinuates a number of complexities besetting the potential landscape 
encounter. The oil painting (183cm x 122cm), in full length human scale, depicts a popular 
television cyborg, the Dalek,16 staged within a quasi-Australian bush setting. The high degree of 
verisimilitude in the rendering of subject and outdoor scene serves to cast doubt on their 
authenticity rather than confirm it. The full-length figure of the Dalek in stately three-quarter 
pose is reminiscent of 17th and 18th century British portrait convention in which society subjects 
are posed against various natural scenes and hence within the status boundary of the landed 
classes. The work is envisioned in the manner of Sir Joshua Reynolds (1723 –1792) and 
Thomas Gainsborough (1727- 1788), the detail of the yellow butterfly depicted on the 
painting’s left-hand edge is borrowed explicitly from Gainsborough’s The Painter`s Daughters 
Chasing a Butterfly, (1756). An Australian-ish habitat is identifiable through the depiction of 
native eucalypts but introduced species also share the stage, along with the generic foliage of 
painterly invention. Like the Dalek, the Australian landscape tradition is in part the introduced 
product (and to some, an introduced pest) of a distant European imagining. And like the Dalek, 
the landscape is encoded, albeit more subtly, with the same colonialist agendas. At the same 
time, the totalising and diffusing nature of landscape setting folds our exotic invader/subject, 
along with its ideological  
 
16 Created by Terry Nation in 1963, the Dalek is a well-known science-fiction cyborg featured in the long-running 
BBC television series, Doctor Who (1963-present). As the preeminent villains of the Dr Who fictional universe, the 
Daleks are rather bad-tempered, imperialistic, genocidal, and hell-bent on the colonisation of new worlds. 
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programming, seamlessly into a benign, and “native” whole. Both Dalek and landscape hover 
across differing registers of the local and the exotic, the insider and the outsider, the native and 
the introduced, the natural and the synthetic. 
 
 
Figure 13 Dalek in Landscape. 
 
 
The Dalek’s presence in the landscape then may seem an anachronistic or even parodic one— 
more accustomed as it is to coasting along smooth BBC corridors. Yet the Dalek as an “exotic”, 
as an extra-terrestrial, insinuates a subjective presence in the landscape that is conceivably more 
authentic than our own. As a radically different instantiation of consciousness, the Cyborg’s 
subjective presence cannot be easily highjacked by the cultural and ideological agendas we may 
have encoded within the landscape view. (Such ideas were made to work upon us.) Nor can its 
own self-presence be attributed to a trick of Western language systems. The Dalek is 
nevertheless driven by its designer’s own narrow programming agenda, namely to rule and to 
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“exterminate” all inferior life-forms - in short, anything that isn’t a Dalek. (Hence the Dalek is 
presumably encoded with an intensely clear sense of the demarcations between its own identity 
and physical “body” and other subjects and non-subjects). The very narrowness of the Cyborg’s 
programing may also fail to pre-determine the nature of the interaction allowing other 
possibilities to arise. Encased inside the Dalek’s armoured shell is a biological core which may 
harbour its own innate environmental preferences. The gap in the Dalek’s programming may 
allow this repressed but still living biological substrate to reassert itself. The element of the 
butterfly becomes a related factor. In Gainsborough’s original work, the butterfly appears to 
trigger a transformation of environment into something more diffuse and filled with 
metaphysical meaning for the two young subjects. Perhaps Gainsborough’s butterfly provides a 
similar catalytic element for the Dalek—a triggering quale that might initiate this process of 
encounter. Equally possible however, is the annihilation of such promptings given the Dalek’s 
preoccupation with extermination. Pursued further, the two impulses are perhaps not so 
incompatible after all. The Dalek’s literally hard-headed implementation of territorial conquest 
may render it unmoved by aesthetic and poetic dimensions of the land. Yet the landscape way of 
seeing becomes an ideal supplement to the Dalek’s desire for territorial conquest. Programming 
the cyborg for spectatorial rapture may motivate the desired acquisitive behaviour. For the 
Australian viewer familiar with the Dalek as an intergalactic colonizer, his presence becomes a 
apt expression of the Australian colonial landscape. 
 
Pregnant within Dalek in the Landscape then, is the possibility of a totalising encounter 
between a potential subjectivity (highly compromised though it is) and a natural environment 
(highly compromised though it is). This potentiality is contingent upon the interactions between 
dialectical variables rather than determined by explicit intentions that are themselves the 
outcome of these variables. Both Dalek and the landscape as composite ideas are complex 
amalgamations of biomass, technology, subjectivity, and ideology. The interactions in play, 
both for the Dalek and for us, suggests an uncertain, contingent and unstable subjective 
presence in relation to the landscape. 
 
At issue, as The Dalek expresses, is the status of the subject and its presence within the 
landscape idea. How that status has been conceptualised in the context of late 20th century-early 
21st century landscape discourse becomes the focus of the remaining discussion. 
 
 
Subjectivity and the Cultural Turn 
 
The cultural (and linguistic) turn weighs heavily upon how concepts of mind, subjectivity and 
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consciousness are formulated in landscape discourse. While there are a number of prominent 
thinkers associated with these developments17, Derrida’s influence (1976; 1981) is especially 
significant as consciousness becomes a central issue for his intellectual project. Indeed, 
Derrida’s ambition to demystify the “Western metaphysical tradition” as he calls it, is 
pursued principally through an attempt to debunk consciousness (Bellou, 2013). His 
debunking of consciousness and the sense of self in turn underpins his widely exported 
notion of Deconstruction. Enthusiastically deployed to both the visual arts and cultural 
geography, Deconstruction and its anti-consciousness underpinnings, are in turn exported to 
landscape theory and practice in the late 20th century. Derrida’s preoccupation with dualisms, 
or “binary oppositions” is particularly salient to debates in both consciousness and landscape 
research. 
 
While Derrida’s conception of Deconstruction will be familiar to an academic readership, this 
discussion briefly revisits his critical framework through the lens of consciousness.  
 
Subjectivity and the self, Derrida argues, are notions founded on the myth of self-referential 
presence (Matless, 1992; Soja, 1989). Derrida’s “debunking” of consciousness is an essentially 
linguistic one extending on the work of Ferdinand Saussure. For Saussure, words possess no 
independent meaning of their own but only derive meaning from their contrastive relationships 
with other words –by differentiating (good-bad, up-down etc.). Derrida asserts that this system 
of differentiating signifiers never terminates at a signified however. An external referent is 
never arrived at because the text is always differed by yet another signifier18. More radically 
still, Derrida argues that there is no prediscursive foundation of consciousness, no 
“transcendental” signified that exists prior to or underneath language formulation. In other 
words, Derrida regards our felt sense of being a distinct agent imbued with subjecthood as an 
erroneous metaphysical assumption confected by our language systems. This erroneous 
assumption nevertheless makes communication possible. 
 
Derrida contends moreover that consciousness is not simply erroneous but ethically 
compromised since this system of differentiating signs is organized around violent hierarchical 
pairings or “binary oppositions”(1976). Within this oppositional logic, one term (the positive, 
pure, desirable term) is defined in relation to its subordinate opposite: its negative, absent or 
 
 
17 Of these, Barthes has perhaps more explicitly discussed landscape (Barnett, 1998; Strohmayer, 2005; Wylie, 2007) 
while Foucault’s spatial formulation of the knowledge/power nexus also has specific relevance for landscape 
researchers (see James Duncan & Duncan, 1992). 
 
18 For this closed system of differing and deferring ad infinitum, Derrida coins the term différance. 
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undesirable “other” (Bellou, 2013, p. 22). Indeed, Derrida regards the history of Western 
thought as one based on an unstable system of violent oppositions (between good vs. evil, mind 
vs. matter, man vs. woman, speech vs. writing, pure vs. impure) because one term always 
contains traces of its other. Hence talk of a “present self” or a self-sufficient subject cannot 
denote what it claims to denote because it will always contain traces of an “absent other”. 
Given the quasi-religious importance Derrida and other deconstructionsists invest in the notion 
of “the other” (as a collective term for oppressed and subordinated identities), notions of 
subjects and consciousness become not only ontologically but ethically untenable. Whether 
Derrida regards consciousness as biologically grounded but inaccessible or more radically no 
more than a linguistic construct, is open to interpretation. Derrida’s (in)famous pronouncement 
however: “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte”—generally translated as “there is nothing outside the 
text”— does encapsulate a dominant intellectual trend where self, subjectivity, and 
consciousness are quite literally “written off” (Bellou, 2013). 
 
Exported into the arts and humanities, Deconstruction also becomes dominant in discussions 
around landscape in Geography and the Visual Arts in the late 20th century. Derrida’s 
reimagining of the world as politically violent, interconnected cultural texts could be readily 
applied to landscape theory. Landscape could be reformulated as a kind of iconographic text 
that could be “read against itself” (D. E. Cosgrove, 1984). As the cultural geographer 
Strohmayer puts it, “Post-structuralism…expanded upon the realisation that, for every 
postulated structure there exists an unacknowledged but necessary, ‘negative’ context” (2005, 
p. 8). This kind of “resistant reading” provided many correctives, if often mono-dimensional 
interpretations of Western landscape art. An Australian colonial landscape portraying a white 
European explorer happening upon an untouched natural wilderness, for example, could be read 
oppositionally (with some justification) as an expression of the erasure and removal of a black 
indigenous population already dwelling on an entirely familiar cultural landscape. Conversely, 
an English pastoral scene staffed with peasants (Constable’s famous Hay Wain, 1821 for 
example) may acknowledge the presence of the rural poor but only by re-imagining their 
labours, their degradation and exploitation as the rustic pleasures of agrarian labour. To speak 
then of landscape in terms of private personal encounters is, on this view, not only to fail to 
read the “text” critically, but to be complicit with the violent hierarchies those texts supported. 
Anderson (2010), writing in the South African post-colonial context, reminds us of how our talk 
of heightened experiences with landscape can be deflated: 
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[We are] inclined to connote ‘statements of awe in the face of a new landscape, 
which pretends that a landscape is ‘found’ rather than ‘made’ and present rather 
than represented. In fact, the occasion of that ‘awe in the face of a new landscape’ 
is really colonisation and the making of colonial space (2010, p. 1). 
 
This distrust in consciousness is readily folded into Marxist critiques that emerged in 
Geography in the early 80’s (see Bermingham, 1987; D. Cosgrove, 1985; 1988; 1984; 1988; 
1985a, 1985b; 1989; James Duncan, 1994; 1988; 1992). Opposed to the “reductive 
subjectivism” of prevailing phenomenological and humanist approaches to landscape in the 70s, 
such critiques questioned Geography’s fixation on personal experiences which failed to 
adequately recognise landscape’s ideological dimensions. As Cosgrove writes, discussions of 
landscape “in the neutral and refined area of subjectivity and humane discourse…serve purely 
to sustain mystification” (1985:58). Landscape, Cosgrove argued, is not an experience but a way 
of seeing: one that developed with the “invention” of linear perspective in Italy in the early 
1400s. This new mathematical perspective was, for Cosgrove, not a merely neutral tool for 
representing space but rather a symbolic expression of the mercantile values of the Florentine 
ruling class (1985). Land is systematized as a pictorial system “so that it may be appropriated 
by a detached individual spectator to whom an illusion of order and control is offered through 
the composition of space according to the certainties of geometry.” (D. Cosgrove, 1985, p. 55). 
The perspectival landscape in turn constructs a single proprietary “subject” afforded with a 
commanding, ordering and totalising gaze over an expanse of territory. In the process of turning 
land into landscape, a potential experiencer is displaced by a pre-established ideological subject 
that is not a subject. It is in this Marxist sense that ideology and landscape as its instrument, is 
often referred to as “false consciousness” (Cosgrove 1984 &1985; Baker 1992). 
 
As exemplified by the Dalek and the forensic agent, the studio practice recognises these 
ideological dimensions as variables within its wider system of relations but rejects the reduction 
of landscape to ideology and ideology hunting. Along with the obvious implication that a crime 
has been committed, the forensic also implicates the landscape’s complicity in covering it up—
by breaking down, fragmenting, mixing, integrating, covering over, compacting, camouflaging 
or otherwise concealing the evidence. The painting Search Party (in day-glow orange), from the 
PhD exhibition (Figure14), depicts a dense bush landscape colonized by a team of forensic 
investigators clad in high-visibility clean-suits. The landscape scene and its semi-opaque foliage 
works upon the investigators as they work upon it, fragmenting and re-integrating the figures 
into the scene as they attempt to dissect and fragment it. As the party combs through the bush 
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setting, the bush setting responds in kind, pressing toward the same day-glow orange colours 
that were designed to avoid such optical mixing of subject and scene. The landscape in its 
“desire” to diffuse new constituents not only conspires to 
conceal the material evidence but the investigation of it as well. 
 
 
Figure 14 Search Party (in day-glow orange) 
 
 
 
Despite a number of ontological and political differences between Marxist and Post-structuralist 
frameworks19 both become merged within landscape discourse. Landscape transitions smoothly 
from ways of seeing to ways of reading. In the process, the anti-subjectivism of Marxist 
revisions mutate into a more radical kind of post-subjectivism in Post-structural and 
Postmodern frameworks. Consciousness as a neuro-biological feature of the human animal is 
hence untenable within these ethico-political and linguistic frameworks. Consciousness, in 
short, becomes a kind of discredited ghost in the machine. 
 
 
 
19 In particular tensions around the coherence of the term “ideology”. This tension can perhaps be best illustrated by 
the status of the veil in landscape theorising. The Marxist notion of the veil connotes a concealment of the lived 
realities that lie behind it. Post-structural and Postmodern approaches also invoke the notion of veil but do not 
necessarily subscribe to the belief that there is a more-real world beyond to be concealed by ideology or revealed by 
critique. There is only to veil, its texture, weave, and folds to discuss. 
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Collectively, these Marxist, Poststructuralist, Deconstructionist, and Postmodern frameworks 
make an important contribution to our understanding of landscape: they illuminate the 
relationships between representation, land and the use and misuse of power; they reveal 
landscape’s entanglement with ideology and they sweep discussions about space, subjectivity 
and landscape into much broader debates about race, power, geopolitics, gender, and class. 
They also ensure that landscape discourse inherits a degree of scepticism in which any 
reengagement with consciousness must be made against the backdrop of these problematical 
conditions. Importantly, in the context of this project, these anti-subjectivist approaches take 
tacit assumptions about subjective consciousness and considers them as an explicit problem. We 
are given a “critical” (third-person) explanation of the problem, if only for the purposes of 
disqualifying that problem from the discussion. While these treatments are populated by various 
constructed “subjectivities” and “identities” they are far removed from the realm of real bodies, 
minds, and the material world. 
 
Moreover, in attempting to do away with authentic subjectivity they do so by claiming a 
“critical” third-person position from the “outside”. The landscape “experience” is not a 
subjective exchange between self and scene they argue, but a dissimilating process that only 
seems inner, seems private, qualitative and subjective. By invoking the quality of seeming 
however, such frameworks become a paradoxical enterprise, for, in the case of consciousness it 
is precisely the seeming that remains at issue (the quality of seeming does not come for free.) As 
Descartes first demonstrated (Cogito, ergo sum) the irrefutable presence of the seeming 
confirms the datum of consciousness. It is the very quality of seeming (seemingly “inner”, 
seemingly “personal”, seemingly “private”, seeming self-authored, seemingly “affective” etc.) 
that we recognize as phenomenal consciousness. To say that something is not what it seems is 
also to recognize that something exists (even if as only an illusion) in relation to a first-person 
point of view. As these perspectives reinforce against their purpose and no matter how duped 
we may be by the landscape idea, it is nevertheless one that depends on the presence of 
consciousness. 
 
Ultimately such perspectives, while revealing consciousness as a problem, also attempt to 
replace the more complicated interactions between human-landscape relations with relatively 
simple rubrics of textual analysis and ideological critique. Paradoxically, these late 20th century 
critiques essentially undermined their own attempts to debunk subjective presence by re- 
implicating them via underlying assumptions of deception and the presence of seeming. The 
period does not attempt to grapple with consciousness or quite reasonably, set the problem 
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aside, so much as contrive its demise. This conspicuous absence of consciousness from 
landscape discussion would inevitably provoke its spectral return. The following chapter 
identifies some of the ways this return of subjectivity has been negotiated and in turn offers an 
allied but alternative approach. 
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4. The Neuroscientist: Deeper Content and the Return of 
Consciousness. 
 
More recent discussions on landscape have pushed back against the reduction of landscape to 
matters of ideology and textuality and in particular to the dematerialization and disembodiment 
of the landscape idea by the Marxist, Post-Structuralist and Post-Modernist frameworks. One 
of the ways current discourse has done this is by reengaging with deeper content such as 
notions of presence, agency, subjectivity and sentience. O’Keeffe expresses it thus: 
 
We claim landscapes to be ‘spaces or ‘places’ or both simultaneously, that exist 
reflexively in our cognitive as well as our corporeal experiences of the material world, 
shaping and being shaped by our simultaneously multiple identities as humans…Its 
connection with the realms of the cognitive and mnemonic and so the general issue of 
consciousness is therefore inalienable. Landscape then is now characterised implicitly 
as a product of mindscape (2010). 
 
This has also come with returned anxieties about how (and how much) we should talk about 
subjectivity if at all, in the same sentence as landscape. As James Elkins expresses in the 
excellent panel discussion Landscape Theory Art Seminar (2008), landscape, “once an 
avowedly ideological matter, has “been replaced by a kind of de facto phenomenological 
understanding” - a return to landscape, as he puts it, as the most diffuse, ungraspable and 
unbounded “occasion for meditating on the unity of the self” (Elkins, 2008, p. 4). And as 
Marshall reiterates in the “assessments” section, “in place of the old guard’s political strategy 
of demystification [we have] a new praxis that we might dub ‘remystification’ (2008, p. 103). 
For Elkins, this deliberate “remystification” undermines the program of revisions and critiques 
that laboured to disentangle subjectivity from landscape in the first place. “Subjectivity is at 
issue, but I also think that if you talk directly about subjectivity you’ll end up ruining the 
conversation” (2008, p. 198). 
 
This project, while understanding such anxieties, rejects this admonition to avoid addressing 
subjectivity head on. Failing to adequately define terms, clarify models, and acknowledge the 
context of the brain only serves to further mystify conversations around landscape and misses 
opportunities for new knowledge. This chapter explicitly explores how consciousness studies 
intersect with practice outcomes and how specific models of consciousness might expand upon 
our conversations on landscape and the subject. 
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Recent Approaches to Subjectivity 
 
Recent discussions have indeed seen a resurgent interest in the landscape idea beyond 
ideological critique. Many of the more recent approaches have, to be sure, not fully disavowed 
the former frameworks but rather reshaped them in ways that permit reformulated notions of 
consciousness to re-enter discussion. This has also meant a re-interrogation of the seemingly 
dualistic structures that the phenomenology of consciousness generates. The re-emergence of 
phenomenological perspectives (Wylie 2003; Ingold 2012) for example, seek to reanimate the 
notion of landscape as a direct lived experience, often in ways that attempt to dissolve the “me- 
it” subject/object boundaries traditionally associated with both subjectivity and landscape, 
particularly the landscape as picture. Phenomenological perspectives focus on notions of 
embodiment and “being-in-the-world” and how these immersed states can be communicated 
(Wylie, 2007). The application of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to landscape theorising 
(Ingold, 2012, p. 1) challenges a number of binary oppositions by extending notions of agency, 
and other human capacities, to non-human entities including morphological features such as 
rocks, trees, rivers, and mountains, etc.20. Similarly, Benediktsson and Lund’s (Allen, 2011; 
Bergsten & Zetterberg, 2013) metaphorical exploration of landscape as a kind of conversation 
evokes the idea of a reciprocal relationship between sentient interlocutors. The conversational 
metaphor implicitly invokes consciousness by repositioning human and non-human entities as 
‘equal participants’ within a communicative exchange. Topological approaches to geography 
and landscape studies attempt to connect affective, poetic, symbolic, objective and physical 
dimensions of landscape. Proponents such as Wylie assert that what matters most is not the 
division of the world into discrete entities, human and non-human, conscious and non-conscious 
etc. but that these entities are themselves the outcomes or effects of a system of connections, 
relations and networks (Wylie 2007). 
 
As the above perspectives attest, the return of the subjectivity and related capacities such affect, 
sentience, cognition and agency to the center of landscape discussions has tended to take on a 
non-proprietorial and non-hierarchical disposition—one that acknowledges landscapes’ 
complex multidirectional interactions with such capacities. The context of the brain—perhaps 
 
20 These notions of distributed agency are given some support in the form of Extended Mind Theory (EMT). Its 
originators, Chalmers and Clark (1995) hypothesise that the realms of the neural and the extra-neural are not simply 
synonymous with the inside and outside of the skull. Environment, they claim, “can become quite literally 
incorporated into the thinking and acting systems that we identify as our minds and bodies” (2013, p. 16). EMT, and 
more contentiously still, the Extended Conscious Mind hypothesis (Thompson & Cosmelli, 2011) challenge the idea 
that there are clear operational boundaries between the mind/brain and the external world. 
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considered too emblematic of the traditional dualisms that these perspectives seek to unweave 
—remains conspicuously absent from such discussions however 21. We turn directly to this 
neglected context here. To constrain the scope, I will address but one neuroscientific approach 
to consciousness among many. I discuss specifically Susan Greenfield’s neuronal assembly 
model as a way of structuring, in combination with the studio practice, further speculation on 
the relationship between landscape and consciousness. In the process, I open but one pathway 
through the neglected territory of consciousness studies and demonstrate how those ideas 
intersect with the landscape investigations in the practice research. 
 
 
 
The Theory: Neurophysiological Indices of Consciousness 
 
In The Private Life of the Brain (2000), Susan Greenfield proposes a theory which gives an 
account of the neurophysiological processes and interactions that correlate to consciousness22 
(2000; S. Greenfield, 2007, 2011; S. Greenfield & F.T. Collins, 2005). This is contextualized 
within the broader search for the so-called neural correlates of consciousness, or NCC23. 
Greenfield firstly argues that consciousness is on the move. Like the brain itself, consciousness 
is developmental, plastic, and increasingly personalized as experiences accumulate. 
Consciousness moreover does not merely exist in on or off states but within a continuum of 
higher and lower states. Greenfield uses the analogy of a light not simply flicked on or off but 
fitted with a dimmer switch: “this switch could vary from almost imperceptible light, say, the 
consciousness of invertebrates, to the floodlit brilliance of adult human consciousness” 
(Greenfield, 2000:168). These varying quantities of consciousness can in principle be measured 
“bilingually” in brain activity and correlating behaviour. 
 
The quantity, degree or depth of consciousness, Greenfield postulates, correlates to the size of 
highly transient neuronal assemblies that form and disband within the brain (consistent with the 
timeframes of conscious moments). “Variable degrees of consciousness [are] reflected in 
 
21 There are no doubt a number of reasons why the brain is de-emphasised in such approaches, but this is not 
investigated in these discussions. 
 
22 By consciousness, Greenfield means our capacity for individual subjectivity, the fact that we feel “our” 
perceptions along with a sense of self for whom these perceptions seem to belong. 
 
23 Greenfield stresses that this is not an explanation of consciousness. NCC research seeks to find an index of 
consciousness, matching up brain activity with corresponding subjective experience. It does not as she puts it explain 
the middle step, “how the water is turned into wine”. 
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varying sizes of neuronal assemblies” (S. Greenfield & F.T. Collins, 2005, p. 21). The size of the 
assembly depends largely upon the degree to which more durable pre-existing neural networks 
are recruited into the transient assembly process. These preexisting neural networks contain our 
prior experiences, associations, and memories: the very content that furnishes the self process. 
Hence the sense of self is central to this ebbing and flowing of subjectivity in Greenfield’s 
theory because it is the extent to which the sense of self, the pre-existing networks that correlate 
our accumulated experiences, associations and memories, that largely determine the assembly 
size and the depth of consciousness from moment to moment. 
 
The size of these transient assemblies in the brain are determined by the interaction of two main 
variables modified by other factors. Greenfield offers the metaphor of a stone being thrown into 
a puddle. Just as the stone sends evanescent ripples across the puddle’s surface, so too an 
instigating external stimulus or set of stimuli (the stone) will spread out from a specific point 
within the brain. 
 
The first variable Greenfield compares to the size of the stone. The bigger the stone, the larger 
the net size of these assemblies, the deeper the level of consciousness. Conversely, the smaller 
the stone, the smaller the neuronal assembly, the shallower the state of consciousness. The size 
of the stone however will be different for different individuals however, as the relative import 
and significance of a particular set of stimuli exerted upon consciousness differs from individual 
to individual. To use Greenfield’s example, a photograph of her mother will presumably 
conscript more extensive neural networks for her than it will for individuals for whom the 
photographed subject has no such connection. For Greenfield, the sense of self is also a 
quantitative variable within the conscious moment; one that is affected by incoming 
environmental stimuli but also “colours” incoming stimuli. 
 
The second variable Greenfield compares to the force at which the stone is thrown. This is a 
measure of the sensory magnitude, the “loudness” or intensity of a given set of stimuli such as 
the brilliance of a light, the scale of an object, the pungency of an aroma; the proximity of a 
physical threat. An alarm clock for example, may throw the stone with enough force to rouse 
consciousness from sleep states. Increasing the alarm clock’s volume still further however, will 
not increase consciousness correspondingly on Greenfield’s model but rather reduce it (at this 
point Greenfield’s puddle metaphor seems to break down). Indeed, extreme sensory stimuli – 
“throwing the stone too hard” will overwhelm the self-process or in other words, reduce the size 
of the transient assembly. 
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The quantity of consciousness is not, therefore, a simple aggregation of these two variables. 
Rather there is a trade-off between the size of the stone and the force at which it is thrown – 
between the associational richness of a given stimulus and its sensory ‘loudness’. (Indeed, 
confusingly for her metaphor, the two variables take on an inverse relationship at some point 
along this continuum.) For Greenfield, extremely emotional states, such as terror, rage, rapture 
and elation or experiences of an intensely sensory nature, accordingly constitute relatively 
shallow states of consciousness.  In such instances we literally “lose ourselves” on the 
neurological level (2000) 24. Deep states of consciousness on the other hand are dominated by 
our cognitive faculties and where stimuli are integrated with personal meaning. Such states are 
characterized by a “numbing” of the emotions and the tempering of the sensory world outside. 
Depression for example, Greenfield postulates, is no less the result of an exaggerated mind, a 
mind possessing or more accurately, accessing too much sense of self - to the extent that the 
subject’s external world is “dulled down” and now seems “grey and remote” (S. Greenfield, 
2011). Greenfield’s model therefore also carries implications for our experience of time: raw 
emotional experiences and other shallower states of consciousness are tied to the here and now 
while deeper states of consciousness, states that recruit our preexisting networks, are steeped in 
past memories and projected into uncertain and “troubling” futures (Greenfield, 2000). 
 
There are many implications in Greenfield’s model for discussions on landscape, first among 
them is the status of consciousness’ as an analogue quantity. Greenfield’s “dimmer switch” 
conception of consciousness immediately confronts certain intuitions we may have about 
consciousness that are relevant to our discussions of landscape. While much of our mental 
activity—our attention levels, the particular contents of our thoughts, and our moods—we 
experience as waxing and waning, our sense of being conscious seems either present or not25. 
 
24 Greenfield uses the example of the Rave party. The sensory and chemical bombardment, with its strobing lights, 
drugs, and pulsating, repetitive music of the rave party conspires to drown out the accumulated networks that furnish 
the self. Equally, the raw emotions, strong sensations, and rapid turn-over of conscious moments that characterise the 
experiential life of a small child reflect a still developing sense of self, one that is easily overwhelmed by incoming 
sensations but becomes increasingly tempered as “inner resources” of the personalized brain accumulate into 
adulthood (Greenfield, 2000; 2007). 
 
25 Marcel Proust, in Swanns Way ingeniously expresses this more elusive sense of subjectivity beyond all-or-
nothing states, but also hints at both the varying degree of consciousness across different species, as well the 
assembly-like process of consciousness in a single sentence: “When I used to wake up in the middle of the night, 
not knowing where I was, I could not even be sure at first who I was; I had only the most rudimentary sense of 
existence, such as may lurk and flicker in the depths of an animal’s consciousness […] but then […] out of a 
blurred glimpse of oil- lamps, [I] would gradually piece together the original components of my ego (Proust & 
Scott-Moncrieff, 2008). 
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So too, the illusion of the ‘Cartesian theatre’ inside our heads seems either to be running, when 
we are awake or not, when we are in dreamless sleep. From an “objective” scientific perspective 
however, a binary conception of consciousness does not coherently map on to our analogue 
minds, bodies, and environments. If we possess a capacity for consciousness, at what point did 
we acquire it? At what stage in our evolutionary development? As Homo Sapiens, 
Australopithecines, Pliopithecines? At what point in our embryonic and physiological 
development? As toddlers, newborns, fetuses, blastocysts? Which species should we attribute 
such a capacity? Clearly, we would, in these instances, be forced to draw a line where none 
exists. As Dawkins (1996, p. 7) admonishes, we are habitually prone “to splitting a continuous 
variable into two discontinuous categories”. 
 
Analogue consciousness and the landscape 
 
This empirical matter of whether consciousness is an analogue or binary phenomenon is not a 
trivial one for landscape. If we assume a binary conception of consciousness then there is no 
relative degree of consciousness which can manipulate or be manipulated by exchanges between 
participant and environment within landscape’s system of relations. Subjectivity is either present 
or not. As we saw in the previous chapter, previous landscape theorizing tends to make this tacit 
all-or-nothing assumption about subjectivity— turned off by the positivist geographies of the 
1950s, turned back on by the phenomenologists of the 70s, turned back off by the anti-
consciousness tendencies of the cultural turn, and turned on once more by the neo- 
phenomenologists of more recent theorizing. It follows however that on a binary model, 
landscape may at most be employed as a device for switching subjectivity off since we must 
assume consciousness must already be turned “on” (that we are awake and awake to 
environment) in order for a subject to initiate a landscape experience. Conceiving consciousness 
as merely present or absent therefore renders our conceptions of landscape-subject interactions 
static and fixed at a foundational level of analysis that is perhaps at odds with a landscape’s 
explicit conception. Landscape itself occupies a largely passive role vis-à-vis consciousness, 
becoming merely its reportable contents. An analogue conception of subjectivity alternatively 
renders the interaction between landscape and consciousness a more dynamic one at this 
foundational level. This concept of an analogue consciousness coupled with a heightened 
interactivity between subjectivity and external world resonates with the practice-led investigation, 
its reiterative production and re-production, and the framing and interpretation of its outcomes. 
 
 
- 49 - 
 
 
Landscape as Assembly Space 
 
Interpreting the practice from Greenfield’s neuronal assembly model, the static landscape 
painting similarly becomes an improvised assembly space where temporal, environmental and 
historical elements could be pastiche-ed into the picture plain. As the Prelude outlined, the 
sites and motifs themselves, increasingly urged such a conception of the landscape: the lack 
of horizon and explicit perspectival cues within the remnant bush sites created an under- 
determined space in which the positionality of elements and subjectivities, both inside and 
outside the image, could be negotiated. Landscape depictions increasingly became a process 
of enfolding multiple source imagery—from raw sensory data, first and second-hand 
photographs, art-historical fragments and the groping abstract gestures of paint and brush. 
Thus, site and motif selection (subject matter), developing studio methodology, and 
theoretical framing are synthesised. Here again, Manet illustrates the synergy between 
landscape type, intellectual project, and methodological approach in Le déjeuner sur l'herbe 
(Figure15.1), but more blatantly still in his rapid quasi-impressionist oil sketches. In one such 
sketch, Game of Croquet (1873) (Figure15), we see how the various elements, both human 
and non-human, are clearly cut and pasted from disparate sources that have been arranged 
within a closed semi-abstract stage. While the approach serves as a kind of declaration of 
Manet’s authority over the assembly space of the picture plain, it also tests the limits of 
landscape’s capacity to gather, bind and diffuse the many into the one. In such works, 
landscape becomes not just the subject matter of consciousness but an analogue of it. 
 
 
Figure 15 Edouard Manet Game of Croquet 1873 Figure 15.1 Le Déjeuner sur l'herbe 1862-1863 
 
 
 
In Dwelling 1&2 (figure 16), the notion of the transient assembly is further echoed in the work’s 
subject matter: the remnants of a makeshift shelter improvised out of the available 
environmental elements. The structure offers an objective index of a prior subjective presence 
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 (dwelling) in the landscape and a correlating subjective presence of its absence. The pictorial 
stability imparted by the pyramid structure exists in tension with the figurative content which 
evokes themes of transience, impermanence, and loss—interactions that are further complicated 
by the duplication which both alters and consolidates the form. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Dwelling and Dwelling 2 
 
The notion of the transient assembly space becomes a methodological, art-historical, and 
experiential one: expressed in the character of the landscape, embodied in the making of the 
image and reanimated in the viewer’s reception of it. 
 
 
The Contingency of Landscape 
 
Extrapolating from Greenfield’s model, the static landscape image while the result of its own 
improvised assembly process also becomes an element within the transient assembly space of 
the viewer’s consciousness. Reproduced within a larger diffusion of elements, the landscape 
image is also remixed with prior landscape images and experiences, other memories and 
associations, but also with fresh sensory stimuli. Hence the landscape becomes a diffuse mix of 
real territories and representations, immediate and recalled elements, novel and rehashed 
stimuli. The static tone of the landscape scene, we might speculate, is cast or filtered by the 
transient tonality of consciousness. This is not to say that the static image is necessarily 
registered as a dynamic object by the viewer. Indeed, a sense of object permanence is a feature 
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of our phenomenological experiences with the world, stabilising our experiences within it. That 
the viewer may fail to notice that the landscape object has been subtly reformed and 
reconstituted does not mean that it is not both a modified and a modifying presence within the 
conscious moment. We experience the transient tonality of the mood even as we may perceive 
discrete elements, including the image itself, as unchanged. From Greenfield’s third-person 
perspective however, and as the medium of painting expresses (through its own art-historical 
compulsion to remake and its material inability to reproduce), the static landscape image cannot 
be replicated verbatim but only restaged within subsequent conscious moments, always remade 
within a new improvised assembly of sensations and associations. Greenfield’s theory also 
asserts that as experiences accumulate in the brain over time, the developing sense of self exerts 
more a executive influence over the raw stimuli. The sense of self with its own waxing and 
waning presence casts its own “ambient tone” over the objective scene. Equally, external 
stimuli are not merely the content of conscious precepts but will also modulate the degree of 
consciousness, via its sensory qualities and its significance to the individual. Hence the faded 
Australian Impressionist reproduction outside the oncologist’s surgery, for example, may have a 
different significance and “tonality” for the outpatient (who doubles as an incidental viewer of 
the art work) on the way in to the doctor’s surgery than on the way out— depending on the 
viewer’s prognosis. The phenomenal expression of the landscape then is not located within the 
subject alone nor the art object, nor in surrounding context and transpiring events but in the 
multi-directional interactions between these variables. While consciousness itself is located in 
the subject and such interactions ultimately transpire as a unified product of consciousness, 
from third-person perspectives, the causal interactions between subjective presence and 
environment are bilateral. From such models, it may be more accurate to describe consciousness 
and the sense of self as dynamic variables folded into subject-landscape interactions. 
 
This dynamic contingency in the relationship between subject, subjectivity, and the static 
artwork is materially expressed via the remaking of imagery, modulating “all-over” elements of 
tone, ambient light, and saturation from one version to the next. The juxtaposition, side by side, 
of Quite Nice and Quite Nice 2 (Figure17) provides a conspicuous example in which the bush 
scene is presented in two distinct states. Where Quite Nice (in fact the “recreated” scene and the 
second of the two) is expressed in relatively naturalistic tones, Quite Nice 2 is rendered down to 
a deep charcoal. Altered too, are many incidental details and forms, some observed and some 
improvised out of the flux of abstract paint surfaces. The image then, the practice intimates, has 
been expressed differently within different conscious moments (regardless of whether the 
viewer has changed). Quite Nice 2, perhaps, “exhibits” the transient assembly process attended 
by a “dialled-up” state of consciousness. The raw sensory aspects of the scene are curtailed— 
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greyed down and subdued as both consciousness and the landscape are expressed in large 
assembly mode. As Greenfield explains, “a deeper consciousness is one where the world around 
you is not so much very bright or very noisy – quite the contrary, it is instead a world laden with 
personal meaning.” (2000, p. 182). Alternatively, Quite Nice is expressed more “neutrally” and 
we might speculate, in a more “unfiltered” way in those moments where the sense of self ebbs 
and exerts a subtler presence within the assembly process. 
 
Figure 17. Quite Nice and Quite Nice2. 
 
 
 
 
Tone, Digital Claude Mirrors and the “Hard Problem” 
 
If tone affords us an appropriate analogue of consciousness then Greenfield’s argument for an 
analogue consciousness finds an analogous expression in the dialled tonal and colour 
treatments in the studio work. Like consciousness, tone and tint diffuse the landscape scenes, 
sometimes subtly, sometimes more pervasively, as the above example demonstrates. These 
analogue diallings of the tone are abetted, paradoxically, by the digital workspace. Indeed, the 
variable of tone (and associated notions, tint, colour cast, colour saturation, colour temperature, 
contrast etc.) become particularly unstable dimensions of the image within the digital realm26. 
This lability of tone in the online image-landscape moreover is only partly generated by an 
intentional author-agent. The image is also modulated by unauthored processes: by the factory 
default settings of numberless image-capturing devices for example. The causation of tone, 
ostensibly determined by the image’s author, thus becomes distributed throughout a system of 
users, databases, image capture and image display technologies. 
 
 
26 This mutability is achieved of course partly through intentional manipulation using powerful image-editing 
software. This second unauthored modulator of tone is particularly resonant with the exegetical discussions. 
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As image material in the practice research passed through the digital workspace, manipulations 
of tint and tone became a key (distancing) method for exploring the process whereby elements 
and incidences are “reduced” to a single totality. In this respect, the digital workspace performs 
a role in the practice not dissimilar to the traditional Claude glass or “Claude Lorrain mirror”. 
This usually small, slightly tinted convex mirror, was used to render the outdoor scene more 
more picturesque27 by consolidating the disparate the view into a narrower family of values and 
hues. The studio work Box Hill (Figure18) depicts a (hiding? squatting? observing?) forensic 
figure in the landscape. An overheated and unnatural “digital” magenta light is cast across the 
bush scene. Despite its synthetic quality it is an effect not inconsistent with the operation of the 
original Claude glass which ironically de-naturalised the nature experience the viewer had 
come to see (Poetzsch, 2008, p. 114). And like the forensic presence which turns the viewer’s 
frame of reference on the lost in the bush narrative 180 degrees, the operator of the Claude 
glass stands somewhat perversely with their back towards the physical scene. The aesthetic 
suggests an aberrant even toxic version of the Claude glass effect. Hence the mood of 
contamination is added to the device’s existing capacities to integrate, distil, and diffuse. 
 
 
Figure 18. Box Hill 
 
 
27 Tained in various hues from black, blue, grey, bronze or yellow, the Claude glass was used by artists, amateur 
artists and landscape enthusiasts of the 18th century to “improve upon nature” by infusing the scene with the somber- 
toned qualities associated with the work of Claude Lorrain, the artist from whom the device gets its name. 
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Within the rear-view mirror of modern consciousness research, the intervention of the Claude 
glass into the landscape/subject system of relations becomes curiously instructive. The job of 
transforming land into landscape (through processes of gathering binding and diffusing), and 
imparting its specific tone and emotional key, has been intentionally delegated to an external 
non-conscious mechanism. The viewer, cognisant of the mechanism and its role, in turn 
becomes the separate phenomenological “component” within the operation and the consumer of 
the experience. It is as if these landscape enthusiasts were endeavouring to demonstrate the 
“hard problem” of explaining the relationship between physical mechanisms and subjective 
experience: “look here are the components!”. Whether in analogue or digital form, the idea of 
the Claude glass is comparatively easy to understand in mechanistic terms (of reflection and 
refraction, absorption and distortion of light rays). So too, the operator, if sufficiently eloquent, 
may describe the resulting experience. Why this process of integration and diffusion should also 
elicit a qualitative (often melancholy) dimension however, remains mysterious. Taken for 
granted within our “direct encounters”, the problem of transduction—the explanatory gap 
between these two levels of description—becomes a visible demonstration through the 
intervention of the Claude glass. Hence, as the forensic agent becomes a kind of hinge between 
the distanciated/pictorial /vertical plane and the immersed/dwelt-in/ground plane, so too tint and 
tone become a kind of hinge between the conceptual modelling of the research and the material 
practices of the studio. Used to both render and disperse specific forms; to modulate colour 
and contrast within the picture plane but also produce qualitative mood that extends beyond 
it into the viewer’s space, tone becomes a studio technique, visual phenomenon, metaphor, 
and conceptual model. 
 
In Spotlight, and Spotlight in Green (Figure19), tone is explicitly invoked in the depiction of the 
torch-holding forensic figure. The work (reframed as a thought experiment) suggests other 
ways in which the degree of subjectivity may be modulated but also other ways of thinking 
about subjectivity through the lens of the landscape idea. The two works depict the “same” 
crime scene investigator half-kneeling within a nocturnal landscape. Along with the 
prophylactic clothing, the additional element of the metal platform in Spotlight in Green further 
emphasises the strictly retinal footing of his contact with the land. The flashlight’s beam 
illuminates a small patch of earth in front of the investigator explicitly establishing his intended 
focus. Some of this light spills onto the agent’s own body however, while a second spotlight 
strikes from behind. A metaphorical blurring of boundaries is presented to us between the 
intended object of investigation and the figure’s own unavoidable bodily presence within the 
scene. A familiar (if problematic) metaphor for consciousness, the spotlight, nonetheless draws 
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attention to the fact that we have epistemological access only to that which falls within the 
roaming “frame” of conscious, leaving other mental goings-on “in the dark” (Byrne, 1997, p. 
103). The pool of light circumscribing the figure’s visual attention becomes another doubling 
gesture as it replays the operation of the painting’s own physical edges mean to circumscribe 
our field of perceptual attention. From an objective perspective the figure knows there is world- 
stuff beyond the visible field (and on a phenomenological level he may also feel like the 
director of this roaming field of illumination). As outsider-viewers of the painting however, we 
recognise that for the figure there is only what arises in consciousness and its enfoldings of 
prior moments and future expectations. The forensic agent’s attempt to break down the scene 
into segmented fragments inevitably becomes its own sequence of totalised and diffuse views. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Installation view, Counihan Gallery 2018 
 
 
To return to Greenfield’s quantitative framework, as viewers we can observe the limits of the 
figure’s (visual) consciousness as well as the space outside of the figure’s perceptual access. In 
the reception of the image, it is perhaps we as viewers who seem to be afforded with a detached 
(omniscient) third-person perspective while the forensic agent is trapped in the (egocentric) 
solipsistic sphere of his/her own consciousness. From the viewer’s perspective, the operation 
potentially dials up the figure’s subjective presence. The modulating and shifting  subjectivity 
within the landscape system is expressed and complicated by the variation of colour and tone 
between versions: is the otherworldly green the effect of some objective optical technology, the 
effect of another observer’s idiosyncratic gaze, or an expression of the figure’s changed 
subjective state? The unfixity of  subjective presence is further created by landscape’s 
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entanglement of distanciated pictures and embodied dwelt-in places. The treatment of real 
spaces as though they were pictures ensures that the positionality of participants is not set. 
Hence the outside detached observer of a picturesque scene may quickly become or exist 
simultaneously as a diffuse aesthetic element within someone else’s visual field. The 
intervening landscape painting (Figure19) inserted to formally balance the two versions of 
Spotlight also suggests itself as the medium via which such participants may be doubled in this 
way. 
 
As the examples above demonstrate, the transactions and interactions between visual-spatial, 
material, formal, narrative, metaphorical, historical, conceptual, and psychological dimensions 
that are implicated within the studio work become complicated puzzles within the exegetical 
discussion. The next chapter extends and resolves these speculations upon the figure-scene- 
viewer-painting dynamic. 
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5. The Wanderer and the Forensic: Landscape and the Dials 
of Consciousness 
 
This research project manages the investigation into the relationship between landscape and 
consciousness through a series of structured speculations upon the many elements and 
dimensions in play within landscape’s system of relations. While consciousness science, (and 
Greenfield’s theory in particular) and landscape research, (excavating Simmel’s philosophy of 
landscape in particular), provide overlapping frameworks for interpretation, it is the practice-led 
research that generates and mobilises those speculations through its material imagery. 
 
This chapter rounds out the discussions in the previous chapter though a short comparative 
analysis between two contrasting works: Casper David Friedrich’s The Wanderer above the Sea 
of Fog (1818), henceforth referred to as The Wanderer, (see Figure.20) and Mutual 
Contamination, a keystone work in the exhibition/practice outcomes (Figure21). Friedrich’s 
iconic work of the Romantic sublime provides another contrasting set of variables within 
landscape’s system of relations—a different set of “laboratory conditions”. Emblematic of the 
Romantic movement, The Wanderer also draws out the connective tissue between Greenfield’s 
theory and Romantic preoccupations with subjectivity. Ideas that anchor Greenfield’s thinking: 
the quantitative and qualitative instability of consciousness and the self and the affective 
correlations attached to those differing degrees of consciousness and the self would be 
immediately recognizable to the pre-eminent Romantic thinkers of the 18th and 19th century: 
Burke, Kant, Coleridge, and Wordsworth. Indeed, Greenfield frequently evokes the (Sublime) 
landscape herself in expounding her hypothesis: “Most of us…will readily talk of “raising” or 
“deepening” consciousness by all manner of means, from standing on a mountaintop to listening 
to Mozart” (2000, p. 168) and; “as we already know, when you go to a mountain or a river you 
raise your consciousness, or deepen your consciousness” (in Shaw, 2006, p. 46). The landscape 
system of the sublime, as we shall see, is not quite so straightforward. Nevertheless, the idea 
that rivers and mountain sceneries, the nature in extremis that Greenfield’s examples evokes, 
can be mobilized to intensify consciousness is one valorized and popularized by the 
Romantics28. 
 
 
 
28 J.H Van den Berg (1970) suggests that it was Rousseau in his confessions of 1728, the year he crossed the Swiss 
Alps, who was responsible for initiating the now widespread practice of trekking into the mountains for its own sake 
– “the grand tour” as it was called. 
- 58 - 
 
 
The Wanderer 
 
 
Figure 20 The Wanderer above a Sea of Fog, 1818. 
 
 
Friedrich’s The Wanderer has become emblematic of the confrontation between subjectivity and 
the landscape idea in its sublime form. It depicts a lone gentleman-hiker who gazes out at a vast 
expanse of untamed and primordial nature. A special kind of encounter we imagine, has or is about 
to take place. It is sometimes asserted that the painting’s central ruckenfigur, (literally ‘back 
figure’) serves to mediate our own contemplation of the scene. Yet to view the painting is not 
merely to adopt the viewing vessel of the gentleman-hiker, nor less to simply peer past him, as we 
might do if he were placed to one side. The figure does not yield to our own private encounter with 
the scene. Indeed, there is no coherent scene to behold in the ruckenfigur’s absence. As Koerner 
(1990) points out, it is difficult to see, on closer inspection, how the two landscape halves would 
spatially, topographically, logically, and pictorially knit together at all without the figure. (Of 
course, Friedrich has constructed the scene out of many separate motifs and locations). The 
ruckenfigur conceals this uncertain convergence of geological matter and prevents the landscape 
from denaturing back into its disparate fragments. If there is a landscape experience to be had, it 
belongs to the gentleman-hiker’s alone. The deeper invitation extended to the viewer therefore is 
to speculate on the dynamics of the subject-landscape encounter as the figure contemplates the 
Sublime scene. 
Typical of Friedrich’s works, we are invited to adopt a third-person perspective as we observe 
another subject’s mental state while they too, are in the act of contemplation of subject- 
landscape relations. Employing Greenfield’s model, we are pressed to ask whether the 
landscape in its sublime form raises the wanderer’s consciousness transforming hiker into 
philosopher (generating consciousness in large assembly mode), or does its immense temporal 
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and spatial reach, its alien-ness, and its total indifference to human comforts, threaten to 
overwhelm the self-process, to throw the stone too hard. The challenge between the cognitive 
and the contemplative on one hand (consciousness in large assembly mode) and dumbfounding 
sensation and awe on the other (consciousness in small assembly mode) circulates bodily, 
optically, and epistemologically through the painting. The hiker occupies an ostensibly 
privileged position atop the rocky crest, as a place to augment self- knowledge, yet the view 
below is largely obscured by mere vapour alone while the colossal mountain in the distance still 
rises above him. Similarly, the figure’s body is poised between informal contrapposto and stiff- 
backed readiness; he neither steps toward nor retreats away from the abyss, neither conquering 
or recoiling from the confrontation29. Reynolds description of the sublime in 1785 suggests an 
equally apt summary of The Wanderer: “It seems to stand, or rather waver, between certainty 
and uncertainty, between security and destruction. It is the point of terror, of undetermined fear, 
of undetermined power!” (in Battersby, 2007, p. 146). The landscape’s vacillation between 
visual clarity and misty obscurity, concrete and intangible, knowledge and incomprehension, the 
eternal and the here and now, become tensions within the painting that forestalls any final 
determinations. Rather we become aware, using this neurocentric framing, of the situation’s 
capacity to ‘move the needle’ of consciousness. 
 
The confrontation between raw sensation and the self is also accompanied, mediated, by ideas 
about landscape. Since there is no conceivable utilitarian motivation, it is the idea of the 
Sublime that has moved the flesh into position. So disposed, the figure attempts to trigger 
changes in consciousness via the landscape—changes that may reveal deeper truths. Inherent in 
the idea of the Romantic sublime landscape is the capacity, as Hepburn (1996, p. 191) expresses 
it, to “reveal something fundamental […] about how things really, or ultimately, are: something 
concealed from us in more familiar, temperate, farmed countryside”. For theorisers of the  
 
 
 
29 Interpretations in which the gentleman-subject is said to “dominate” the scene commits to a conclusive reading that 
I would argue the work itself never submits to (Battersby, 2007) for example argues that the male figure, standing 
confidently and ready to step toward the abyss, instantiates a kind of masculine sublime in the Kantian tradition. 
- 60 - 
 
 
sublime like Kant, such revelations are the result of a successful contestation between 
emotionality and the powers of reason. The sublime confrontation provokes profound 
contemplations which subsequently fail to yield to merely human scale comprehension 
(consciousness is small assembly mode). The result threatens to “blow the mind”, to use 
Greenfield’s idiom—or as Reynolds puts it, “the mind that dares to look farther is lost!” (1996, 
pp. 191 -192). The subject, having been exposed to the diminishing forces of raw emotionalism 
and cognitive stupor faces down these forces however via a retaliation of the cognitive. For the 
Romantics then, the Sublime landscape issues a challenge for the “worthy subject”. The 
Sublime becomes a measure of the mind’s capacity (or not) to re-marshal the inner resources of 
the self-process, tempering raw sensation and ultimately procuring an enlargement of the self. 
The landscape, in Romantic terms, facilitates the “superior” mind’s journey to maturity. 
 
The sublime then is structured, I would argue, as a dialectic between diminished and 
expanded states of consciousness. Emotional correlates of the encounter, folded into this 
dialectic, become the conspicuous indicators of this change in consciousness. For the 
Romantics, depressive affect arises as a consequence of excessive consciousness.  The 
Romantic notion of melancholy, as the pleasurable depressions of the superior mind31, 
effectively captures this pairing between the experiencer’s affect and their degree of 
consicousness. As Hartman (1970, p. 47) writes, “we learn that every increase in 
consciousness is accompanied by an increase in self-consciousness…and this increase in self-
consciousness leads in turn to a “morbidity [of the] intellect”. Or as Doctor Who’s Sally 
Sparrow expresses it (in paraphrased form): “sad is happy for deep people”32. This too, aligns 
with Greenfield’s inverse correlation between strength of emotion and degree of 
consciousness. As highly emotional states (extreme pleasure, awe, confusion, fear, etc.) 
betray, for Greenfield, our shallowest states of consciousness, depressive states and muted 
affect— “too deep for tears”30— betray an overly deepened state of consciousness. Hence 
affect becomes for the Romantic intellectual and the cognitive scientist, a more “visible” 
index of the degree of consciousness 33. The deeper origins of landscape’s sense of 
melancholy, we may  
 
30 The phrase is drawn from the last line of Wordsworth’s poem Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections 
of Early Childhood 1804: “Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears”. 
31 The convergence of great intellect, an overactive consciousness, and “low spirits” was imagined as an occupational 
hazard for Romantic poets such as Wordsworth, Mill, Carlyle, and Coleridge, (see Battersby, 2007; Garber, 1970; 
Hartman, 1970). 
32 The exact quote and full dialogue can be found in the BBC’s Doctor Who, Series 3, Episode 10, first aired in 2007. 
33 Given melancholia’s correlation in the 18th century to certain desirable intellectual capacities, namely excessive 
rationality, intellect, and introspection, a diagnosis was not conferred indiscriminately but ascribed more readily to 
men of white, middleclass, European decent (Elizabeth A Dolan, 2003; 2008) 
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speculate, are to be found in the landscape’s capacity to agitate the self-process, a process 
steeped in past memories and projected into uncertain futures. 
 
The dialectical logic of the Sublime, embodied by The Wander, suggests a landscape-subject 
system that does not merely dial consciousness up or down but rather (in “successful” 
iterations) shuttles consciousness between very small and very large assembly modes. 
Exceeding the middle band of modulations characteristic of habituated everyday 
consciousness, the sublime’s diallings of consciousness across the limits of the continuum 
leads to a permanent net increase of the self (an in turn to its affective correlation: pleasurable 
sadness). This aspect of consciousness itself —its movements across the consciousness 
continuum—usually inaccessible in everyday phenomenal consciousness, threatens to become 
knowable. It is when these “production-side” aspects of consciousness become opaquely 
registered within the phenomenological realm that these deeper truths emerge and the notion of 
the landscape-encounter begins to resonate. 
 
 
The Forensic 
 
 
 
Figure 21 Mutual Contamination 
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Like The Wanderer, Mutual Contamination (Figure 21) depicts the human subject isolated within 
the landscape scene. Far-removed from the wild and infinite sublime of German Romanticism, 
the figure in Mutual Contamination is embedded within a dense but unremarkable patch of native 
bush. With head bowed, he appears to be examining his own hand or something in it, or 
alternatively, the ground at his feet while his lower body dissolves into the native grass. Like the 
Dalek discussed in Chapter 3, the forensic agent presents for the viewer another instance of a 
seemingly de-subjectivised subject in the landscape. Where the Dalek’s capacity for subjectivity 
is uncertain, the forensic agent attempts to actively suppress a personalised “owned” experience 
of the outdoor scene. 
Antithetical to the kind of heightened experience sought by the wanderer, the forensic agent 
embodies an attempt to nullify qualitative entanglements with the land. Like the figure in 
Friedrich’s work (the wanderer), the forensic agent is cast as a disembodied eye. Where the 
wanderer seeks out the diffuse and all-encompassing, the forensic investigator must resist the 
landscape way of seeing so that he may find and interrogate the fragment. The gridded search 
patterns the crime scene investigation are deployed to comb the scene for indexes of human 
presence not to succumb to the general tonality of the view. The forensic’s prophylactic clean- 
suit, mask and gloves are a conspicuous reminder of this effort to maintain objectivity and clear- 
cut boundaries between himself and the external scene. 
 
Heightening his (and the landscape’s) tensions between the optical and the corporeal, the 
forensic is immersed bodily within the very substance he must remain physically and 
subjectively detached from. The dilemma is a familiar one to consciousness researchers who 
are also immersed within the phenomena they wish to study from the outside and from an 
objective distance. The tension between proximity and distance is expressed by the ostensible 
gesture of self- examination and in turn the implication or threat of contamination—the 
involuntary mixing of human and environmental elements. The processes that have effectively 
mixed the missing subject into the landscape have turned upon the forensic figure. That which 
belongs to the realm of the self (feelings, urges and physical body) and that which belongs to 
the non-self becomes uncertain. No longer an observer positioned outside the causal system, the 
distanciated and anti- subjective stance of the forensic figure is thus potentially compromised. 
The capturing of this moment, the fundamental switch of his attention from (crime) scene to the 
self, takes on an introspective tone that is only amplified by the (quarantined?) landscape which 
presses mood and space inwards toward the figure. The search for the discrete fragment has 
itself become diffuse and subjectivity itself appears to contaminate the scene. 
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We observe a tone of diffuse introspection not only despite the subject’s contrary intention and 
purpose but also deepened by being against purpose.  This mood is also present in works such 
as Forensic Scene (Figure 2, page 6) in which the depicted forensic agent crawls on all fours 
within a darkened landscape. While her gaze is directed at the external scene, it is difficult not 
to project a similar mood of introspection, or at least something very different from visual 
empiricism, as her gaze threatens to encroach upon the boundaries of the body. 
 
Despite the anti-subjective stance of the forensic subject, the encounter resonates with 
Romantic attitudes toward the appropriate engagement with landscape and nature. For the 
Romantics, such engagements could also begin with a steady scientific gaze which would 
ultimately become redirected to the examination of the self and as a result transfigure the whole 
scene. Wordsworth serves as the pre-eminent example. Known for his commitment to the close 
observation of the external facts, this commitment nevertheless culminated, as Whitehead 
submits, in the “mysterious presence of surrounding things, which imposes itself on any 
separate element that we set up as an individual for its own sake… grasping the whole of 
nature…in the tonality of the particular instance” (Whitehead, 1932, p. 117). The forensic field 
agent’s explicit efforts to deny the subjective dimension may also give way to a more profound 
retaliation of the sense of self. We may detect a sublime-like contestation between subject and 
scene that ultimately result in dispersal of the attributes that belong to the subject/self and those 
that belong to the external realm, an entanglement of inner and outer worlds. 
 
The deepening of subjectivity against purpose however, returns us to the practice’s more 
proximal art-historical connections— to the 19th century Realists and their antipodean 
offspring, the Heidelberg painters. Mantz’s (1847) advice for the 19th century landscape painter 
effectively lays out the Realist’s own set of correlations and causality within the landscape 
laboratory: “the more intensely and scrupulously a painter observes a given site, the more 
subjective and irregular the picture—even the site itself—becomes, defying what everyone, the 
artist included, might have expected from this effort at objectivity” (in Shiff, 2005, p. 763).  
Hence the artist’s attempt to remain an objective and detached recorder of the landscape scene, 
paradoxically re-established the subjective presence of both artist and scene, a subjectivity that 
had been eroded by stifling academic formulas. Following Mantz’s direction, subjectivity is 
returned not only during direct contact with the setting but preserved indexically in the 
unselfconscious and idiosyncratic facture of the paint. The viewer’s reception of painted 
surfaces then becomes somewhat paradoxical: the more conspicuous its objective materiality, 
the more it seems to implicate the seemingly immaterial subjective presence of the artist. 
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Inferences Drawn by the Forensic Painter 
 
The two comparisons above hint at a broader emergent thesis within the studio practice which 
centres on a potentiality we might call the landscape-encounter. The notion of the landscape- 
encounter finds a theoretical framing via the project’s excavation of Simmel’s conception of 
landscape. To restate, Simmel’s landscape process (itself inspired by Romantic framings) is not 
merely an optical and perceptual integration of outdoor elements but involves a more 
comprehensive diffusion of all elements within the system including the subject. Hence  the 
felt boundaries between world stuff and mind/body stuff become experientially permeable. As 
Chapter 2 argues, these landscape processes are analogous to (and entangled with) processes 
we would expect also to find in a system that generates phenomenological consciousness. The 
differentiated yet diffused quality of our conscious percepts must entail some similar process 
whereby elements/inputs are selected from the flux, bound together, and diffused into a single 
self-sufficient oneness. This oneness is drawn from the greater flux but it is also a 
representation of that greater flux. Hence both landscape and consciousness are contradictions 
of a kind—both bundled fragments extracted from the flux that nonetheless make the 
experience of totality possible. 
 
Simmel’s expression of landscape however, seems to exceed the conditions we would need to 
confer the status of landscape upon a given exchange. Hence a differentiation of terms is 
necessary firstly to capture this rarer more elusive additional layer of (over) integration and 
diffusion which Simmel describes. Critically, Simmel further describes landscape’s unique 
mood as an opaque registering of these processes. Thus, the staging of the potentially 
transfiguring encounter in the studio response and Simmel’s Philosophy of Landscape, take on 
significance in the project not only because they attempt to capture the ‘something it feels like’ 
to have such an encounter—an experience that is no doubt worthwhile pursuing for its own 
sake—but because they bring to the phenomenological surface, some underlying but usually 
tacit feature of experience. That is to say, the non-conscious “production side” processes at 
work in the generation of landscape and by extension, the generation of consciousness, are 
made phenomenologically accessible, albeit puzzlingly so, in the landscape-encounter. 
 
In this re-reading of Simmel, it is this totalising process underlying the landscape idea that 
becomes epistemologically accessible via first-person experience. Greenfield’s neurological 
modelling of consciousness suggests another tacit aspect of landscape/consciousness that 
becomes registerable within the phenomenological realm. This second “surfacing” is the sense 
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that subjectivity and the sense of self, are themselves furtive, waxing and waning, or rising and 
falling presences within the “stream” of consciousness. The felt sense of the “I” and the “me”, 
the proprietor and receiver of experience, that are usually illusions of constancy and continuity 
in everyday experience, are revealed as radically analogue presences in the landscape- 
encounter. The landscape-encounter hence becomes one way in which the curtain between the 
hidden production side and the reportable consumption side of landscape/consciousness is 
pulled aside and where the gap between what it is and what it’s like briefly coincide. 
 
Such convergences between first-person perspectives and what we at least believe to be third-
person perspectives (what we believe to be objective facts) ultimately generate new intuitions 
that in turn lead to new knowledge. Given so many of our intuitions stymy as much as enable 
insight into our unsolved problems, the generation of new intuitions is an essential step. Here, 
artists and practice-led researchers can play a particularly active role. 
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6. Conclusion: renegotiating the landscape as it is made to 
seem 
 
The exegetical discussion recognizes that far from being the background of the background, 
consciousness circulates actively within, and is inalienable to, the landscape idea. How we 
conceive of consciousness has substantive implications for how we conceive and experience 
landscape and equally, our conceptions of landscape make various claims, intentionally or 
otherwise, about the nature of consciousness. The project argues that in order to develop a 
deeper understanding of landscape a more explicit engagement with consciousness is warranted. 
one informed by consciousness research. Because the process of converting land into 
landscape requires the involvement of an observer-participant-subject, all conceptions of 
landscape operate in relation to some conception of consciousness. The interaction remains a 
largely tacit and under-formulated one however within landscape discourse. Hence I have in 
these discussions attempted a more frontal assault on consciousness in thinking about 
landscape, one which seeks to extend our understanding of past formulations and inform our 
efforts to revise and re-shape the landscapes of the future. 
 
The project has argued that the context of the brain is central to this appeal for a more explicit 
approach to subjectivity. While phenomenological accounts are invaluable, we know from 
several decades of brain research that these end-user accounts of subjectivity dissimilate as 
much as they explain. Downstream from the processes that generate experience, 
phenomenology can misattribute the causes of those experiences to secondary factors. The 
limitations of scope prevented a more detailed exposition of these misattributions. The 
speculations prompted by the practice-led research point however to future investigations. The 
Prelude’s brief speculation on the personal salience of landscape and its pervading sense of loss 
serves as an example. Such affect-effects are, respectively, usually assumed to be due to the 
landscape’s resemblance to the viewer’s specific habitat history,  and the physical literal loss of 
environments. The project’s framework speculates alternatively that such qualities may be the 
result of the way that landscape images simulate or insert themselves into our neurological 
operations—operations charged with recalling past events which must be reconstructed in 
contradistinction to the context of the present. So too, rather than explain the presence of 
melancholy in the landscape in terms of some more proximate or putative causes34 
 
 
34 Pamuk (2006, p. 42) for example locates the feeling of melancholy is far more proximal, contextual and 
geopolitical causes. In the Turkish context he argues that this beauty of melancholy is attributed largely to “the 
feeling of being peripheral” and the consequence of “Western modernization”. 
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such as modernization habitat loss, Chapter 5 suggests that this quality is in part the affective 
by-product of the landscape system’s augmentation of consciousness—the result of system 
imbued with an excessive sense of self. The final exhibition suggests that the mood effects of 
tint and tone simulate something of the binding and diffusing qualities of consciousness. As 
these examples demonstrate, the project’s engagement with consciousness studies open up new 
territory for the artist-researcher working in the field of landscape research. Far from closing 
down imaginative speculation, scientific models such as Greenfield’s suggest alternative 
interpretations. Her analogue model of consciousness insinuates a more dynamic system of 
interactions between the processes and structures of consciousness and the processes and 
structures of landscape. 
 
While the context of the brain is fundamental to progress in consciousness research it is, for 
various reasons, one that has been neglected within landscape research. This reluctance to 
engage with subjectivity in the context of the brain lingers even as the explicitly anti-
subjectivist approaches of the late 20th century have given way to a rekindled quasi-interest in 
subjectivity and cognate capacities such as affect, memory, agency, embodiment, and sentience 
in discussions of landscape. The reasons for eschewing third-person perspectives on subjectivity 
in the context of landscape while not pursued in detail in this exegesis, no doubt reflect broader 
historical disputes within the academy as well as  current attitudes prevalent in cognate research 
cultures. Is the context of the brain perceived as a disavaowel of environmental and cultural 
contexts? Enclosed within the skull, is the brain regarded as a threat to perspectives which argue 
for a more distributed conception of sentience—one that is dispersed more equitably across 
living and even non-living entities? So too, the rising incompatibility between departments of 
biological science on one hand and certain commitments held with humanities disciplines on the 
other also threaten to re-enforce old divisions between the “two cultures”. No doubt older 
deeper fears of scientific “positivism”, “essentialism” and “reductionism” also persist—a sense 
that despite science’s reengagement with consciousness it remains a framework that is 
fundamentally incompatible with the subjective realm and with intuitive ways of thinking and 
making. 
 
Consciousness has therefore circulated as a mostly spectral presence in landscape research, co- 
shaping conceptions of landscape from the shadows and leaving many underlying assumptions 
(about the nature of both consciousness and landscape) unexamined. As we have seen, the 
spectral presence of circulate/remain/persist even in theorisations of landscape that radically 
disavow the presence or existence of subjectivity and consciousness at the deeper pre-
discursive level. Chapter 3, focusing on Derrida’s anti-subjectivist framework and its 
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integration with Marxist readings, provides an acute example. Employing a what-is-really-
going on logic, such frameworks effectively argue that landscape is not a matter of subjective 
experience but only seems so. The exegesis argues that this is a distinction without a difference 
from the point of view of most theories of consciousness. Indeed, the presence of a seeming 
appears to be indistinguishable from the something-it-is-likeness that constitutes phenomenal 
consciousness. At the very least, it is not made clear from such perspectives how such 
deceptions and seemings transpire without the presence of a first-person perspective to 
misattribute the transaction as a first-person experience. 
 
The discussion of subjective experience in landscape practice and theory has no doubt suffered 
a necessary loss of innocence brought about by this wave of anti/de/post-subjectivist critiques of 
the late 20th century. Clearly any constructive reengagement with consciousness in landscape 
research inherits the more problematical conditions that these critical perspectives leave behind. 
The forensic presence in the practice, with its implicit assumption of a concealed crime, 
acknowledges that the landscape does indeed have a “dark side” (Barrell, 1983) but this is only 
one of landscape’s many “contaminations”. Far from demystifying landscape, the attempt to 
reduce landscape to ideology only serves to further mystify the underlying processes by which 
landscape effectively launders ideology. In this respect, the project’s discussion of “diffuse, all- 
encompassing totalities” prompts further ideological critiques around just who and what is to be 
included or excluded within the self-sufficient totalities of landscape. 
 
Anxieties around subjectivity however, are particularly elevated in contemporary discussions on 
the depicted landscape. In researching the project extensively, it became clear that there was a 
marked asymmetry between the richness of contemporary landscape painting on one hand and 
the paucity of contemporary writing on landscape representation on the other. This too, warrants 
further research. While ambitious landscape painting is plentiful on the world stage, its 
surrounding discourse has surprisingly little to say on how such works contribute to the 
development of landscape as a set of ideas and traditions. No doubt, lingering associations 
between the pictorial landscape tradition and outmoded ideologies are particularly persistent, as 
are vaguely militaristic connotations of the “scopic” and the “panoptic”. To once again discuss 
the landscape “as it is made to seem” (Anderson, 2010, p. 1) may for some be to surrender the 
strategic ground. More fatalistically, to talk of subjectivity in relation to the landscape image 
may be to talk, as Dubow ponders, “about something that we fear is no longer available: a 
dialogue between self and space that is no longer cognitively, or even existentially, possible” 
(2008, p. 131). 
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The project has developed its own response to these anxieties and gaps in knowledge by 
developing a constructive approach to the relationship between the landscape idea, the 
landscape image, and consciousness. The simple notion of “seeming” as we have seen, is a key  
 
one in the project, linking the separate operations of landscape, subjectivity, and 
representational painting. Each medium can be said to be in the business of constructing the 
world and the self as it is made to seem. The presence of seeming recognizes the explanatory 
gap between what is and what it is like and insinuates two sides (or “surfaces”) of a process: a 
qualitative reality consumed by the end-user, (the subject), and a non-conscious production side 
that gives rise to this qualitative experiential product. The symmetries between Simmel’s 
philosophy of landscape and Crick and Koch’s search for the neurological correlates of 
consciousness which open the introductory discussions, reveal that both landscape and 
consciousness can be considered an effort to negotiate the interactions between material 
substances and seemingly immaterial moods by focusing on the processes that mediate between 
them. The novel approach and contribution of this project has been to broach these “views from 
different angles” (as Simmel put it), through an original synthesis of perspectives drawn from 
the visual arts, landscape research, and consciousness studies. 
 
The project’s preoccupation with the notion of seeming also seeks to avoid continuing 
landscape’s cycle of avowals and disavowals of subjectivity. By taking subjectivity seriously, 
the project does of course reaffirm the central goals of earlier subjectivist traditions: from the 
Romantics, examined in the previous chapter, to the neo-phenomenologists. In an important 
respect however, the project is also the logical extension of late 20th century anti-subjectivist 
frameworks. By problematizing consciousness and reframing it as a dissimilation, those anti- 
subjectivist frameworks draw our attention to the gap between the what-it's-likeness of 
landscape and the how-it-works, although this project obviously disagrees on where answers to 
the latter lie. Nevertheless, such anti-subjectivist perspectives highlight, most certainly against 
purpose, the analogous problem spaces of landscape and consciousness. In this way, the project 
is the unholy offspring of both subjective and anti-subjective traditions. 
 
The project’s themes and questions are important however, not only because they may correct 
the excesses of oppositional reading, or break with theoretical patterns, or expose a marked 
asymmetry in the relative health of contemporary landscape painting on one hand and the topic 
of contemporary landscape imagery in the discourses of contemporary art on the other. The 
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 landscape image and its entanglements with real spaces remains important because it remains 
pervasive, if perhaps only subtly so, within our everyday transactions with the world35. This 
becomes clear when we consider the many ways we continue to use landscape. We use it to 
construct, project, and maintain national, local and personal identities —to help bind peoples 
into unified tribes but also to Balkanise the world into separate ones. We use landscape to 
promote our personas and our properties. The landscape view is used to both decorate our 
dwellings and sell them. As a therapeutic tool, views of the landscape (real or depicted) are used 
to revivify bodies and minds, to enhance mood, and to help us recuperate and convalesce. And 
as our discussion of The Wanderer and Mutual Contamination, demonstrates, landscape also 
becomes a meditation upon the self. We use it in our attempts to alter states of consciousness— 
to facilitate or avoid contemplation, to gain or escape self-knowledge, to “find” or “lose our 
selves”, or perhaps, if consciousness is as labile as Greenfield hypothesises, to shuttle our 
consciousness back and forth between different ends of the consciousness continuum. We use 
the landscape experience to tune in to “something bigger” or pleasurably “zone out” from our 
own neuroses and over-connected environments. 
 
The landscape view, as The Wanderer alludes, and the Claude glass demonstrates, is of course 
an idea that manoeuvres real bodies into real outdoor settings. Subjects attempting to “lose 
themselves” in the pursuit of heightened aesthetic and subjective experiences, often manage to 
also literally lose themselves, as the forensic presence in the practice alludes, sometimes 
permanently and tragically within the horizonless Australian bush. To that (ultimate or 
penultimate) end, we use landscape as a picturesque setting for depositing our dead, and in our 
more clandestine interment activities, to dispose of bodily evidence. Curiously, where our 
official burial grounds suggest a site ripe for, and charged with, converting the deceased into an 
intact immaterial soul, the native bush settings of the studio practice suggest a site in which the 
subject is unequivocally returned to world-stuff, returned to scattered organic matter and 
remixed into the greater flux. 
 
Beyond the grave (and the ambit of this project) we use landscape views to commune (still) 
with the divine and buttress beliefs in a creator-god—or to substitute such beliefs with secular 
notions of nature and the numinous. We shape and reshape it, medicalise and even weaponise 
 
 
35 Landscape paintings and reproductions remain the most popular theme for artworks displayed within the home 
(Halle, 1993). The landscape view also dominates wall-calendar imagery, postcards, and computer screensavers. Out 
of Amazon’s top five best-selling calendars for 2018, four featured terrestrial landscape photography; the remaining 
best-seller featured Lunar landscapes. 
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it—indeed, the principles of prospect and refuge apply equally well to both military strategy and 
picturesque convention. We fight over it, commodify it and pay a premium just for a better view 
of it. The idea of landscape hence remains important to us as a repository of personal, historical, 
and cultural knowledge; as a medium of economic, metaphysical, symbolic and aesthetic 
exchange; and as an exploration of (and diversion from) the self. All of these many applications 
of landscape ultimately involve transactions with consciousness. 
 
To assert that consciousness is fundamental to landscape is not to reduce the many uses and 
dimensions delineated above to consciousness. (landscape as ideology should not become 
landscape as consciousness.) The project and its studio outcomes are not a prescription for how 
landscape should be constructed, but rather attempts to ponder the interactions between 
subjectivity and the landscape in new ways. The history of landscape has perhaps reached a 
point at which we must treat with additional scepticism any purging of other framings and other 
dimensions for the sake of theoretical expediency. For if the various histories, traditions, 
practices and antecedents of landscape (both cultural and evolutionary) were once separate, they 
are no longer. Indeed, landscape as a process of binding, diffusing, and totalizing elements, is 
now also a product of such processes: a confusion of multiple ideas woven into a single botched 
concept. 
 
If landscape serves as a laboratory of subjective and material interactions, the practice explores 
those interactions by generating various tensions, pressures and potentialities within the 
landscape system. These dialectic tensions are structures around, on the one hand, notions of 
dwelling place, “life-world”, and immersed insider participants; and on the other, notions of 
detached outsiders, distanciated views, illusions, and art-historical convention. By activating or 
agitating these dialectics, splitting and recombining variables, the problem spaces of landscape 
and the problem space of consciousness become mutually incorporated. We appreciate more 
fully through the project that both fields must grapple with the contested relationships between 
subjective experience and objective matter (between landscapes of the mind and landscapes 
underfoot); between notions of “inner” self and “outer” world (between viewer/participant and 
the scene); between first and third-person perspectives (between detached observer-bystanders 
and embroiled insider-participants); between fragment and the whole; and between invisible 
entities and their simulated representations (between mind and consciousness, nature and 
landscape). The practice research explores these dualities through its figure/setting 
relationships, its use of tint and tone and through its use of repetition and variation of imagery 
which complicates the painted landscape as “self-sufficient” totality. The forensic motif, as the 
Prelude argues, becomes a kind of hinge between these two realms or planes, the hinge-link 
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figure finds historical echoes in Millets Gleaners and Manet’s Le Dejeuner sur l’herbe. 
Through the forensic motif and other figures such as the Dalek, the practice remixes and 
destabilises these overlapping sets of dialectical relations. The threat of contamination in the 
forensic scenario however moves from destabilised to potentially transformation. The 
possibility of transformation in turn prompts speculation on the causal factors at work as in the 
examples of The Wanderer and Mutual Contamination. 
 
The possibility of transformation manifests itself in the practice as the emerging notion of the 
landscape-encounter. The encounter emerges as a potential within the practice works, perhaps 
for the depicted figure or perhaps for the viewer. Beyond the registering of a landscape object or 
scene, the landscape-encounter implies a momentary felt entanglement of environmental and 
neurological elements in a way that usher production-side processes into the reportable 
phenomenological realm. As discussed in Chapter 5, the potential transformation of landscape 
objects and surrounding elements into the landscape encounter, suggest conditions for the 
creation of new knowledge as the usually inaccessible processes mediating between material 
components and seemingly immaterial subjective moments become the potential object of 
contemplation. The landscape encounter becomes the potential for insight into an objective 
feature of experience. Such insights, or mistaken insights, for we cannot be sure, inevitably 
influence future experiences. Our “objective” perspectives and subjective perspectives are not 
siloed: what we believe to be objectively true of a phenomenon interacts with how a 
phenomenon feels from first-person perspectives: the sailor’s beliefs about the objective nature 
of the earth—as spherical or flat— alters his or her felt experience of the voyage. This must also 
be true even in the case of consciousness itself. What we believe to be objectively true about the 
nature of consciousness inevitably influences the phenomenological texture of our experiences 
in subtle ways. 
 
To speculate upon the relationship between landscape and consciousness in this way may well 
be regarded as just the kind of “re-mystification” of landscape Elkins warns against. However, 
they are also speculations that are testable in principle. Ultimately, the value of scientific 
models such as Greenfield’s lie in their ability to be tested, falsified or modified to 
accommodate new evidence. By integrating such practice-led speculations with increasingly 
falsifiable theories (as methods of falsification in the context of the brain continue to improve) 
those speculations are in turn exposed to falsification by empirical methods. The kind of 
creative play and speculation (whether informed or fanciful) that characterizes the visual arts is 
of course valuable in itself and need not be obligated to empirical research cultures, nor 
however must we always cast them in opposition. 
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Ultimately a return to questions of subjectivity in relation to landscape is not simply a return to 
metaphysical flights of fancy. As much as landscape’s physical forms, ideological 
entanglements and the many mediums used to depict it, the subjective seemings that cast their 
ambient tone upon the landscape idea are also brut facts. Evernden expresses the point in his 
discussion of Wordsworth’s approach to nature: “To speak of ‘the brooding presence of the 
hills’ or ‘that mysterious presence of the surrounding things’ as if they are real is certain to 
strain our credulity. These are subjective are they not? […]” But we do experience them, just as 
we experience the size and shape of the items in the landscape…” (1993, p. 33 my emphasis). 
 
The third-person scientific and non-dualist perspectives folded into these discussions no doubt 
underscore point: human consciousness while mysterious is a matter of wholly physical goings- 
on. However, regardless of the nature of consciousness: material or not, natural or not, 
generated by the brain or not, it remains a fact of the matter within the tangled concept of 
landscape, the doubting of which, as Descartes showed, only confirms its immanence. 
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